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NODAL GOVERNANCE OF THE U.S.
ELECTRICITY GRID
ALISON GOCKE*
The U.S. electricity grid faces more challenges on a wider scale than
ever before—climate change, energy poverty, crumbling grid
infrastructure, the pending onboarding of millions of new grid devices,
etc. Preparing the grid for these challenges is not an engineering
problem, but rather a governance one: we need a new model for how to
govern our grid.
Grid experts often advocate for one of two centralized governance
models: the command-and-control system associated with the early
development of the electricity grid, or the neoliberal system associated
with more recent market reforms.
This article argues that both of these models are wrong. Neither
model accurately describes how the grid has functioned in the past or
how it ought to function today. Instead, a close examination of the grid
and its history reveals a highly decentralized network in which private
firms, industry associations, public utilities, local organizations, and
state and federal regulators all influence grid governance. This landscape
is more aptly labeled a “nodal governance system,” wherein power is
wielded by a variety of state, sub-state, and non-state actors.
The nodal governance model is not only descriptively accurate, but
also useful. First, using a nodal governance framework, we can develop
a true topography of all the players and “power” flows on the U.S.
electricity grid. Second, a nodal governance system carries certain
benefits we often associate with decentralized governing systems and
may even provide a path forward for current policy issues, such as the
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regionalization of California’s electricity grid or the Green New Deal.
And third, the nodal governance model reveals the threat that a grid
jurisprudence premised on centralized models—recently embraced by
the Supreme Court—could pose to our grid. This article argues that we
ought to preserve the grid’s nodal nature and leverage it to prepare the
grid for the future.
INTRODUCTION
Electricity is a necessity in the modern world. But as the recent
example of Puerto Rico shows us, the system that delivers that
electricity—the electricity grid—is vulnerable to failure.
As the U.S. moves into a future where electricity becomes even
more central to our lives—powering our phones, computers, cars,
homes, and essentially every private and public institution in the
country—our electricity grid faces more threats than it ever has before.
Climate change,1 energy poverty,2 cybersecurity attacks,3 crumbling

1. In order to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to the levels agreed to by the international
community in the Paris Climate Agreement, carbon dioxide equivalent emissions from the U.S.
electricity grid must drop around 70% below today’s levels by 2050. RACHEL CLEETUS, ALISON
BAILIE, & STEVE CLEMMER, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, THE U.S. POWER SECTOR IN
A NET ZERO WORLD: ANALYZING PATHWAYS FOR DEEP CARBON REDUCTIONS 1 (2016).
Practically, this means that by 2030, coal-fired power plants must be almost entirely phased-out;
natural gas plants must comprise less than a third of electricity generation; and non-hydroelectric
renewable energy must provide almost 50% of our electricity needs. Id. at 7 fig.4.
2. In 2016, approximately 2.9 million people in eighteen states had their electricity cut off
because they were unable to pay their bills. Jim Polson, More Americans Are Getting Their
Electricity Cut Off, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Oct. 13, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2017-10-13/in-great-american-blackout-millions-go-dark-due-to-unpaid-bills. The U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services reports that more than six million households receive
financial aid on their home heating bills through the Low Income Home Energy Assistance
program (LIHEA), a federal program designed to provide financing to low-income families
struggling to pay their electricity bills. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., LOW INCOME
HOME ENERGY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM: REPORT TO CONGRESS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2014 vi
(2014). And LIHEA funding has only been able to reach around 19% of eligible households. Id.
3. According to a 2016 report prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy, there have
been an increasing number of cybersecurity events on the U.S. electricity grid over the last few
years, primarily in the form of malware attacks intended to hack into grid computer systems. ICF
INT’L, ELECTRIC GRID SECURITY AND RESILIENCE: ESTABLISHING A BASELINE FOR
ADVERSARIAL THREATS 17 (2016). The Director of National Intelligence, Dan Coats, has even
warned that ongoing and ever-more-advanced cyberattacks to critical U.S. infrastructure,
including the electricity grid, threaten a “Cyber 9/11.” Dan Coats, Director of National
Intelligence, Remarks Delivered to the Billington Cybersecurity Summit (Sept. 13, 2017),
https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/speeches-interviews/speeches-interviews-2017/item/
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grid infrastructure,4 and the massive grid modernization project
required to support millions of new devices5 all present challenges to
the grid on an unprecedented scale. If not properly addressed, these
challenges could lead to dire consequences. Contrary to conventional
wisdom, these challenges are not ones of technology or engineering,
but rather ones of governance. We have, for the most part, the
mechanical systems we need to bring our electricity grid into the future.
What we are missing, according to legal scholars,6 economists,7

1797-remarks-as-delivered-by-the-honorable-dan-coats-director-of-national-intelligencebillington-cybersecurity-summit.
4. The American Society of Civil Engineers estimated that we will have a grid
infrastructure investment gap of approximately $107 billion by the end of the decade if investment
continues apace, AM. SOC’Y OF CIVIL ENG’RS, FAILURE TO ACT: THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF
CURRENT INVESTMENT TRENDS IN ELECTRICITY INFRASTRUCTURE 5 (2011). The electric
industry projects than an additional $298 billion of new transmission system investment will be
needed between 2010 and 2030 to maintain current levels of grid reliability. MARC W. CHUPKA
ET AL., TRANSFORMING AMERICA’S POWER INDUSTRY: THE INVESTMENT CHALLENGE 20102030, at 38 (2008). Climate change is expected to accelerate physical threats to the grid: many
power generation facilities are at risk due to decreasing water availability in a warming climate;
energy infrastructure located along the coastlines is threatened by sea level rise and more frequent
and intense storms; oil and gas supply chains are likely to be disrupted during extreme weather
events; transmission lines operate less efficiently at higher temperatures; and increasing
temperatures can put greater stress on peak demand periods. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, U.S.
ENERGY SECTOR VULNERABILITIES TO CLIMATE CHANGE AND EXTREME WEATHER 7 (2013).
5. In order to incorporate new “smart grid” technologies that allow for a more sustainable,
efficient, automated, iterative, and self-healing grid, we will need to spend somewhere between
$300–$500 billion. ELEC. POWER RESEARCH INST., ESTIMATING THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF
THE SMART GRID: A PRELIMINARY ESTIMATE OF THE INVESTMENT REQUIREMENTS AND THE
RESULTANT BENEFITS OF A FULLY FUNCTIONING SMART GRID 1–4 (2011).
6. See, e.g., Hari M. Osofsky & Hannah J. Wiseman, Hybrid Energy Governance, 2014 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1, 4 (2014) (“Energy federalism and governance are at the heart of this struggle [to
manage modern grid challenges].”); Hannah J. Wiseman & Hari M. Osofsky, Dynamic Energy
Federalism, 72 MD. L. REV. 773, 779 (2013) (calling for “a needed rethinking of energy
governance”); Emily Hammond & David B. Spence, The Regulatory Contract in the Marketplace,
69 VAND. L. REV. 141, 146 (2016) (“The governance challenges and implications [of the modern
grid] alone are staggering, and, at this point, anything but clear.”); William Boyd, Public Utility
and the Low-Carbon Future, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1614, 1620 (2014) (recognizing the need for a
“common, collective enterprise of building and elaborating the institutions, regulatory structures,
and business models that will be necessary to realize a low-carbon future”); Joel B. Eisen, An
Open Access Distribution Tariff: Removing Barriers to Innovation on the Smart Grid, 61 UCLA
L. REV. 1712, 1714 (2014) (“Hardly a day goes by without some call for transformative regulatory
change to the U.S. electric grid to promote the development and deployment of revolutionary
technologies.”).
7. See, e.g., Severin Borenstein, Effective and Equitable Adoption of Opt-In Residential
Dynamic Electricity Pricing, 42 REV. INDUS. ORG. 127 (2013) (advocating for adoption of new
governance mechanisms that incorporate time-varying retail pricing for electricity in order to
improve the efficiency of electricity markets).
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engineers,8 and industry associations,9 is a grid governance model that
can make these changes happen.
The current proposals on the table often revolve around two
stylized versions of grid governance and grid history. The first form of
governance, associated with the formation and spread of the electricity
grid beginning in the early twentieth century and extending through
the 1980s, is known as the public utility or regulatory compact model.10
In this version, the electricity grid is understood as a severely
hierarchical, heavily regulated industry. Electricity is generated,
transmitted, and delivered to end-use customers on a grid governed by
the same monopoly owner and functioning in a single, top-down
direction.
The second form of electricity governance is a neoliberal version
of the grid. This model emerged during the 1980s and 1990s, when
regulators embraced a market-based approach to electricity
management.11 During this time, the federal government broke electric
utilities’ monopoly grip on the wholesale side of electricity sales, forced
utilities across the country to allow non-utility generators access to
utilities’ transmission lines, and established regulated wholesale
markets to allow parties to buy and sell electricity at competitive prices.
Most academics and policy makers have bought into these two
binary versions of grid history, debating whether modern grid
problems should be addressed through a more robust or revised

8. See, e.g., IGNACIO PÉREZ-ARRIAGA ET AL., MASS. INST. OF TECH., UTILITY OF THE
FUTURE: AN MIT ENERGY INITIATIVE RESPONSE TO AN INDUSTRY IN TRANSITION ix (2016)
(“[T]he need for proactive reform is clear. Customers now face unprecedented choice regarding
how they get their power and how they manage their electricity consumption—regardless of
whether they are aware of those choices or are acting on them today.”); J.D. TAFT & A. BECKERDIPPMAN, PAC. NW. NAT’L LAB., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, GRID ARCHITECTURE 4.6 (2015)
(“Due to the relationships between regulatory structure and emerging needs for new types of
coordination, the nature of the interplay between regulatory structure and reliability
responsibility and management are coming under scrutiny in the industry.”).
9. See, e.g., PETER KIND, EDISON ELEC. INST., DISRUPTIVE CHALLENGES: FINANCIAL
IMPLICATIONS AND STRATEGIC RESPONSES TO A CHANGING RETAIL ELECTRIC BUSINESS 3
(2013) (“While we cannot lay out an exact roadmap or timeline for the impact of potential
disruptive forces, given the current shift in competitive dynamics, the utility industry and its
stakeholders must be prepared to address these challenges in a way that will benefit customers,
long-term economic growth, and investors.”).
10. See infra Part I.A.
11. See infra Part I.B.
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version of the regulatory compact,12 or whether better market design
and expanded competition is the answer.13 Also, within the legal
literature, the discussion translates into a federalism issue: should we
look to the federal government (often associated with the neoliberal
market model) to provide clear governance over the grid,14 or should
we promote experimentation at the state level (often associated with
the regulatory compact model)?15 Some have even adopted a
cooperative federalism approach that attempts to reconcile these
narratives.16

12. See, e.g., Boyd, supra note 6, at 1675–1703 (arguing for a thicker conception of “public
utility” in the traditional regulatory compact in order to tackle decarbonization of the grid);
William Boyd & Ann E. Carlson, Accidents of Federalism: Ratemaking and Policy Innovation in
Public Utility Law, 63 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 810, 814 (2016) (advocating for “innovative ratemaking”
in the public utility framework in order to “promot[e] technological innovation and deployment
in the power sector”); Hammond & Spence, supra note 6, at 146–47 (developing a new
understanding of the regulatory compact in a world of increasing market competition and
environmental imperatives); Inara Scott, Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks: Adapting Public
Utility Commissions to Meet Twenty-First Century Climate Challenges, 38 HARV. ENVT’L L. REV.
371, 400–12 (2014) (proposing changes to PUC regulations to address climate change).
13. See, e.g., Eisen, supra note 6, at 1723–30 (advocating for an “open access” principle to
be applied to the distribution system akin to the deregulation of the transmission system that
occurred under FERC in the 1990s and 2000s); IGNACIO PÉREZ-ARRIAGA ET AL., supra note 8,
at x (observing that “structural reform that establishes financial independence between
distribution system operation and planning functions and competitive market activities” would
be the preferred economically efficient solution); Severin Borenstein, Time-Varying Retail
Electricity Prices: Theory and Practice, in ELECTRICITY DEREGULATION: CHOICES AND
CHALLENGES 325 (James M. Griffin & Steven L. Puller eds., 2005) (noting that a real-time pricing
fix to the competitive retail marketplace would “be the ideal in terms of economic efficiency”);
Lester Lave, Jay Apt, & Seth Blumsack, Deregulation/Restructuring Part I: Reregulation Will Not
Fix the Problems, 20 ELECTRICITY J. 9, 10 (2007) (decrying state-level efforts to halt deregulation
and promoting instead changes in market design to enable greater competition).
14. For instance, Joel Eisen argues that FERC has expansive authority to regulate the
electricity grid and should use that authority to promote grid decarbonization through policies
like demand response and a carbon adder. Joel B. Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to
Transform the Electric Grid, 49 U.C.D. L. REV. 1783, 1834–48 (2016). Alexandra Klass and
Elizabeth Wilson also propose that FERC use its preemption powers to engage in “process
preemption” in the siting of additional transmission line infrastructure and use soft powers to
encourage states to join regional transmission compacts. Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J.
Wilson, Interstate Transmission Challenges for Renewable Energy: A Federalism Mismatch, 65
VAND. L. REV. 1801, 1857–73 (2012).
15. For example, William Boyd and Ann Carlson argue that inaction at the federal level has
allowed states to innovate subsidies for different forms of grid decarbonization. Boyd & Carlson,
supra note 12, at 841–92. Shelley Welton suggests that local innovations in municipalization and
community choice aggregation have allowed communities to reassert governance control over
their own grids. Shelley Welton, Public Energy, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 267, 307–46 (2017). And
Garrick Pursley and Hannah Wiseman advocate for devolution of power to municipal
governments in order to encourage distributed energy resource adoption. Garrick B. Pursley &
Hannah J. Wiseman, Local Energy, 60 EMORY L.J. 877, 931–55 (2011).
16. See, e.g., Daniel A. Lyons, Federalism and the Rise of Renewable Energy: Preserving
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But these discussions are making a threshold mistake: assuming
that either the command-and-control model or the neoliberal market
model—both ultimately top-down, centralized governance systems—
describes how the electricity grid actually works. In fact, neither of
these models is correct.
This article argues that we ought to think of the U.S. electricity
system as a decentralized, nodal network. Not just in the physical sense
(with a grid infrastructure composed of a series of nodes where
electricity is produced and consumed, interconnected by a web of
transmission lines along which electricity is delivered), but also in the
theoretical sense. Inspired by the nodal governance model developed
in the world of international security law,17 this article argues that the
State and Local Voices in the Green Energy Revolution, 64 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1619, 1624–25
(2014) (arguing for a cooperative federalism model that preserves federal and state authority in
energy regulation); Felix Mormann, Clean Energy Federalism, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1621, 1657–80
(2015) (applying a dynamic federalism model to Renewable Portfolio Standards and feed-in
tariffs at the state and federal levels); Osofsky & Wiseman, Hybrid Energy Governance, supra
note 6, at 4–5 (proposing an “innovative model of energy governance” based on “hybrid
institutions with strong regional components” to address federalism gaps and overlaps in energy
law); Jim Rossi, The Brave New Path of Energy Federalism, 95 TEX. L. REV. 399, 403 (2016)
(arguing that the Supreme Court has “abandon[ed] dual sovereignty” in energy law and adopted
instead a “concurrent federal-state” jurisdictional framework); Hannah J. Wiseman, Moving Past
Dual Federalism to Advance Electric Grid Neutrality, 100 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 97, 100 (2015)
(explaining that the dual federalism framework no longer fits the electricity system); Wiseman &
Osofsky, Dynamic Energy Federalism, supra note 6, at 814–40 (arguing that a dynamic federalism
model with overlapping horizontal and vertical jurisdictional lines describes the energy law
landscape better than a dual federalism approach and discussing the governance issues that arise
from this overlap).
17. See generally DEMOCRACY, SOCIETY, AND THE GOVERNANCE OF SECURITY (Jennifer
Wood & Benoit Dupont eds., 2009); JENNIFER WOOD & CLIFFORD SHEARING, IMAGINING
SECURITY (2007); Scott Burris, Peter Drahos, & Clifford Shearing, Nodal Governance, 30 AUST.
J. LEG. PHIL. 30 (2005); Clifford Shearing & Jennifer Wood, Nodal Governance, Democracy, and
the New ‘Denizens,’ 30 J. L. & SOC. 400 (2003); Jennifer Wood & Clifford Shearing, Security and
Nodal Governance, Prepared for Seminar at Temple University Beasley School of Law,
Philadelphia (Oct. 25, 2006). Although this article draws principally from the nodal governance
literature, the idea of a non-hierarchical, multi-nodal governance framework is by no means
isolated to the international security law field. For discussions of similar models in the
administrative and constitutional law fields, see, e.g., Jody Freeman, The Private Role in the Public
Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 547–48 (2000); Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as
Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1368–69 (2003); Martha Minow, Partners, Not Rivals:
Redrawing the Lines Between Public and Private, Non-Profit and Profit, and Secular and
Religious, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1061, 1063–74 (2000). In the international law field, see, e.g.,
HANDBOOK OF TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE: INSTITUTIONS & INNOVATIONS (Thomas Hale
& David Held eds., 2011); Anne-Marie Slaughter & Thomas N. Hale, Transgovernmental
Networks, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF GOVERNANCE (Mark Bevir, ed., 2011);
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electricity grid is best described as a series of nonhierarchical
relationships that rely on groups (or “nodes”) of actors consolidating
their power and using formal and informal connections (“networks”)
to manage a course of events. There is no single centralized decisionmaking entity on the grid.
In fact, looking more closely at the history of the electricity grid,
it becomes clear that the grid has always operated as a nodal network,
even during phases characterized as command-and-control or
neoliberal. Informal actors that survived along the grid’s edge, not
captured by the standardized governance frameworks, often dictated
the flow of events. And the changes that we see in grid governance are
not shifts between two top-down governing phases, but rather the
constant evolution of a nodal governance model that has grown more
complex and interconnected over time.
Beyond the simple fact that it is descriptively correct, the nodal
governance model is helpful for three reasons.
First, it allows us to create an accurate topography of the current
grid governance structure and identify the different players and
decision-making processes that determine how our grid actually
functions, which is often overlooked in a top-down narrative. (For
those policymakers and activists looking to make changes on the grid—
even to address some of the grid challenges named above—this
topography is a useful starting point, as it suggests different pressure
points and paths of action.)
Second, building on that topography, we can see the benefits that
a nodal governance structure provides: the decentralized nature of the
grid offers governance advantages akin to those that we see in other
decentralized systems, such as preference maximization; competition
and the minimization of externalities; policy experimentation; local
governance; and minority rule and dissent, to name a few. Such a
topography thus provides potential solutions to intractable policy
TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE: INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS OF REGULATION (Marie-Laure
Djelic & Kerstin Sahlin-Andersson, eds., 2006). In the technology sphere, see, e.g., Julie E. Cohen,
Law for the Platform Economy, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 133 (2017); Orly Lobel, The Law of the
Platform, 101 MINN. L. REV. 87 (2016); Molly Cohen & Arun Sundararajan, Self-Regulation and
Innovation in the Peer-to-Peer Sharing Economy, 82 U. CHIC. L. REV. DIALOGUE 116 (2015).
And in the organizational management world, see, e.g., Keith G. Provan & Patrick Kenis, Modes
of Network Governance: Structure, Management, and Effectiveness, 18 J. PUB. ADMIN. RESEARCH
& THEORY 229 (2008); Peter Bogason & Juliet A. Musso, The Democratic Prospects of Network
Governance, 36 AM. REV. PUB. ADMIN. 3 (2006); Daniel J. Brass et al., Taking Stock of Networks
and Organizations: A Multilevel Perspective, 47 ACAD. MGMT. J. 795 (2004); Candace Jones,
William S. Hesterly, & Stephen P. Borgatti, A General Theory of Network Governance: Exchange
Conditions and Social Mechanisms, 22 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 911 (1997).
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problems that have stalled under a top-down governance framework,
including movements to regionalize California’s electricity grid or to
decarbonize the electricity grid through a Green New Deal-style
program.
Third, we can see that these benefits may be threatened by a grid
jurisprudence premised on an incorrect, top-down understanding of
the grid. In two recent cases, the Supreme Court adopted an
interpretation of the Federal Power Act (the federal law governing the
electricity grid) that prioritizes certain governing nodes over others.
That interpretation, which has already resulted in a flurry of litigation
in the federal courts, could lead to a concentration of power at the
federal level and an upending of the current nodal structure of the
electricity grid precisely when it is needed most.
This article proceeds in five parts. Part I presents the conventional
history of the electricity grid based on the top-down, command-andcontrol and neoliberal models. Part II develops a revised (and more
accurate) grid history based on the nodal governance model, then uses
that model to map out the topography of our modern electricity grid.
Part III lists the governance and policy benefits of a nodal network
approach to the electricity grid. Part IV explains how nodal governance
is currently under attack. Part V concludes.
The legal and policy implications of a nodal governance approach
to the electricity grid discussed in this article are only the tip of the
iceberg. Nodal governance could prove useful to a whole host of
modern grid problems, ranging from the ongoing disputes within states
over how to transform distribution utilities into platform-based
ecosystems where individual homes and communities can buy and sell
electricity18 to the possibility of a “smart home” future where the home
itself is populated with new automated, electricity-intensive devices,
such as appliances, heating and cooling systems, sensory lighting, and
18. The New York Public Service Commission’s Renewable Energy Vision proceeding is
the most prominent example of this move towards a platform-based distribution utility platform.
See PROCEEDING ON MOTION OF THE COMMISSION IN REGARD TO REFORMING THE ENERGY
VISION, 319 P.U.R.4th 1 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Feb. 26, 2015) (order). The California PUC
has also issued a white paper raising the prospect that the state will transition to a similar
customer-participation-focused retail model. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, CONSUMER AND
RETAIL CHOICE, THE ROLE OF THE UTILITY, AND AN EVOLVING REGULATORY FRAMEWORK:
STAFF WHITE PAPER (2017). And MIT’s Utility of the Future report argues that a platform-based
distribution utility model would be preferable in order to encourage the development of a more
advanced electricity grid. See IGNACIO PÉREZ-ARRIAGA ET AL., supra note 8, at x.
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security systems. This article does not aspire to tackle all of these
issues, but rather to lay the groundwork for a nodal governance
approach to the electricity grid. Such an adaptive and innovative
framework can then be used to address the problems that arise as
Americans build an electricity grid fit for the future.
I. THE CONVENTIONAL HISTORY OF THE U.S. ELECTRICITY GRID
What follows is the conventional story of governance theory, as
told by nodal governance scholars19—which, incidentally, maps
perfectly onto the conventional story of grid governance told by most
grid policymakers and experts. Both stories begin with two standard
ways of conceptualizing governance: a top-down, command-andcontrol model (under which the state directly dictates the behavior of
private actors), and a regulated marketplace or neoliberal model
(under which the state harnesses economic forces to direct the choices
of private actors). According to this conventional governance theory,
the history of governance is the history of command-and-control states
transitioning to neoliberal states. According to most legal scholars and
policymakers, the history of the governance of the U.S. electricity grid
follows the same pattern: the electricity grid began as a command-andcontrol model, then transitioned into a neoliberal model.
A. The Command-and-Control Model
We begin first with the command-and-control model, which, in the
conventional story, owes its origins to the writings of Thomas Hobbes.
In his seminal work, Leviathan, Hobbes theorized that the State, rising
out of the state of nature, gains a monopoly over the legitimate exercise
of power via a social contract consented to by the people.20 The people
give up their right to autonomy and self-governance in return for the
State’s promise to provide protection and security. The Hobbesian
model assumes that governance is a centralized, top-down, commandand-control system in which the State is the ultimate source of power

19. The governance history recounted in this section comes from the literature on nodal
governance composed by Clifford Shearing, Jennifer Wood, and other security law scholars. See
generally DEMOCRACY, SOCIETY, AND THE GOVERNANCE OF SECURITY, supra note 17; WOOD
& SHEARING, IMAGINING SECURITY, supra note 17, at 2–20; Wood & Shearing, Security and
Nodal Governance, supra note 17, at 1–7.
20. See generally THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (1968); Clifford Shearing, Reflections on
the Refusal to Acknowledge Private Governments, in DEMOCRACY, SOCIETY, AND THE
GOVERNANCE OF SECURITY, supra note 17, at 19–21; WOOD & SHEARING, IMAGINING
SECURITY, supra note 17, at 9–10.
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and decision-making.21 Although the State can designate other, more
technically competent agents to execute its commands, the
determination of the end goals remains within the State itself because,
under the social contract, it is only this body that can decide the will of
the people.22 Figure 1 presents a diagram of the command-and-control
model, in which decision-making originates at the top and flows down
a hierarchical pyramid.

Figure 1. Representation of a command-and-control governance
framework. Power flows from the top down, and the bottom layer
(signifying private actors) has little input in everyday governance
choices.
The conventional history of the U.S. electricity grid likewise says
that the first phase of grid governance followed this Hobbesian model.
Out of a state of nature emerged a centralized governance system
charged with defining and acting on behalf of the common good under
the blessing of the social contract. To wit: in 1882, the modern
electricity grid is born when Thomas Edison performs the first largescale commercial test of his electric lightbulb.23 Shortly thereafter,
21. WOOD & SHEARING, IMAGINING SECURITY, supra note 17, at 8.
22. Id. at 9–10.
23. JACK CASAZZA & FRANK DELEA, UNDERSTANDING ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEMS: AN
OVERVIEW OF TECHNOLOGY, THE MARKETPLACE, AND GOVERNMENT REGULATION 2 (2d ed.
2010).
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hundreds of “electric lighting” companies popped up around the
country, using Edison’s technology and the lure of the lightbulb as the
means of establishing small, decentralized grids, mostly private and
mostly for the wealthy.24 The wild state of numerous small-scale grids
was quickly followed by consolidation at the hands of a few big players
in the electricity field: Edison’s company (which later became General
Electric), Westinghouse, and Houston-Thomson.25
But the real leviathan of this emerging command-and-control
ecosystem was Samuel Insull, Edison’s protégé and the instigator of the
public utility model.26 While running the Chicago Edison Company,
Insull realized that the secret to increasing the company’s revenues was
not attracting wealthy customers with luxury prices but rather
broadening the customer base by lowering prices and recruiting a
diverse set of consumers.27 This model made the large central turbine
powering the grid—increasingly the preferred technology for electric
utilities—more efficient and cost-effective.28 Furthermore, if electric
utility companies could capture a large set of customers in a single area,
the duplicative transmission lines strung by competing electric lighting
companies in cities across the country could be eliminated. Insull
concluded that a monopoly structure was the best answer to both the
consumer and capital problems that his industry faced.29 Moreover, this
would not be just a simple monopoly, but a regulated monopoly
whereby the state oversaw rate and service standards for the electricity
companies and the companies were granted an exclusive franchise
territory in return.30
Thus began the electric utility version of the Hobbesian social
contract—the “regulatory compact.”31 The regulatory compact
envisioned a straightforward exchange: “In return for an exclusive
24. Id. at 2–3; GRETCHEN BAKKE, THE GRID: THE FRAYING WIRES BETWEEN
AMERICANS AND OUR ENERGY FUTURE 199 (2016); THOMAS HUGHES, NETWORKS OF POWER:
ELECTRIFICATION IN WESTERN SOCIETY, 1880-1930, at 204 (1983).
25. PHILLIP F. SCHEWE, THE GRID: A JOURNEY THROUGH THE HEART OF OUR
ELECTRIFIED WORLD 52, 58 (2007).
26. Id. at 67–80.
27. Id. at 67–69; HUGHES, supra note 24, at 217.
28. SCHEWE, supra note 25, at 67–68.
29. HUGHES, supra note 24, at 206–08, 211–12, 216–17; see also Richard D. Cudahy &
William D. Henderson, From Insull to Enron: Corporate (Re)Regulation After the Rise and Fall
of Two Energy Icons, 26 ENERGY L.J. 35, 42 (2005).
30. HUGHES, supra note 24, at 206–07.
31. See, e.g., Boyd, Public Utility, supra note 6, at 1643 n.106; KARL MCDERMOTT, EDISON
ELEC. INST., COST OF SERVICE REGULATION IN THE INVESTOR-OWNED ELECTRIC UTILITY
INDUSTRY 5–8 (2012).
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franchise, the right of eminent domain, and an ability to sell electricity
at reasonable rates, electric utilities would provide reliable, universal
service and forgo some of the profits that might be attainable in the
absence of regulation.”32 Like the social contract, the regulatory
compact required that the people give up their freedom to choose
amongst a variety of competitive electricity companies and cede
decision-making authority to the public utility commission (PUC) and
the utility itself in return for a guarantee that the regulated utility
would provide for the common good—i.e., providing low-cost
electricity to all customers within its domain.33
To implement the regulatory compact, states passed public utility
laws requiring utilities to set “just and reasonable” rates. PUCs were
formed and instructed to determine what constituted reasonable
expenses and profits for the electricity business.34 In most cases, this
involved cost-of-service ratemaking, or heavily factual and technically
complex administrative proceedings that required utilities and
regulators to determine the “actual prudent costs” necessary to allow
electric utilities to operate effectively.35 Utilities were then allowed to
set electricity rates sufficient to cover their costs and earn a fair return
on investment.
The regulatory compact spread like wildfire across the electricity
business. Between 1907 and 1930, every state but Delaware passed
public utility laws that formed PUCs in order to regulate entities like
electricity companies.36 Meanwhile, Insull and his fellow electric utility
monopolists flourished. By the end of the 1920s, ten electric utility
holding companies controlled three quarters of the electricity

32. Boyd, supra note 6, at 1643.
33. See MCDERMOTT, supra note 31, at 6 (“Under this contract both the utility and
consumers give up certain rights, or in contract law terms, exchange detriments. Utilities accept
the obligation to serve and charge regulated cost-based rates, and customers accept limited entry
(i.e., loss of choice) for protection from monopoly pricing. This bargain represents an ongoing
mutual relationship between the owners of the utility (and their agents) and the customers; in
effect, a relational contract overseen by the regulator.”).
34. For a good explanation of the development of the case law regarding ratemaking, see
Boyd, supra note 6, at 1644–46.
35. MCDERMOTT, supra note 31, at 6. Rate-making cases consider such variables as the total
revenue for the company; the total costs incurred by the company; the rate base or value of capital;
the accumulated depreciation of the capital; the average cost of capital; the company’s operating
expenses; annual depreciation costs; and any taxes the utility paid. Id. at 8.
36. Boyd & Carlson, supra note 12, at 823.
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industry.37 Together, the regulators and the utilities engaged in what
historian Richard Hirsh describes as the “utility consensus,” or the
agreement amongst electric utility executives, progressive era
reformers, public utility commissioners, and economists that the
electricity industry constituted a natural monopoly that required a
single service provider in a franchised area, subject to direct state
monitoring.38
In the decades that followed, according to the traditional version
of electric grid history, top-down, centralized government regulation
of the electricity industry became the norm. In fact, by some metrics,
regulatory oversight of the system increased: in 1934, Congress passed
the Public Utility Holding Company Act, requiring holding companies
that held assets crossing state lines to register with the newly-formed
Securities and Exchange Commission and abide by its financial
regulations.39 The next year, Congress also passed the Federal Power
Act, giving the federal government regulatory authority over
wholesale sales and transmission of electricity that occurred
interstate.40 Around the same time, Congress created the Tennessee
Valley Authority (TVA), a power project that involved the federal
government playing a direct role in the production and sale of
electricity.41
For the next sixty years, so the story goes, very little changed in
electricity governance. Command-and-control regulation of the
electricity monopoly ostensibly produced a steady stream of profits,42
consistent declines in the price of electricity,43 and capital investment
large enough to build giant, centralized power plants and an intricate

37. BAKKE, supra note 24, at 69–70.
38. See generally RICHARD F. HIRSH, POWER LOSS: THE ORIGINS OF DEREGULATION AND
RESTRUCTURING IN THE AMERICAN ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY (1999); see also BAKKE,
supra note 24, at 70.
39. CASAZZA & DELEA, supra note 23, at 214–15.
40. See generally 16 U.S.C. §§ 824–824w (2012).
41. SCHEWE, supra note 25, at 94–106. For more information on the TVA, see generally
NORTH CALLAHAN, TVA: BRIDGE OVER TROUBLED WATERS (1980); WALTER L. CREESE,
TVA’S PUBLIC PLANNING: THE VISION, THE REALITY (1990); STEVEN M. NEUSE, DAVID E.
LILIENTHAL: THE JOURNEY OF AN AMERICAN LIBERAL 64–120 (1996).
42. From the inception of the industry until the 1970s, electricity consumption doubled
every decade. CASAZZA & DELEA, supra note 23, at 4.
43. Retail price increases would not be seen until the 1970s. Paul Joskow, The Difficult
Transition to Competitive Electricity Markets in the United States, in ELECTRICITY
DEREGULATION: CHOICES AND CHALLENGES 31, 35 (James M. Griffin & Steven L. Puller, eds.,
2005).
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web of transmission lines stretching across the entire country.44 Then,
as a series of external shocks rocked the electricity system—the 1970s
oil crisis, a drop in demand for electricity accompanied by an efficiency
plateau for large turbines, and the beginnings of the environmental
movement45—the command-and-control system faltered, and the stage
was set for the transition to the next stage of governance: the neoliberal
marketplace.
B. The Neoliberal Model
According to the conventional governance story, while the
Hobbesian model is a useful starting point for describing how
centralized bodies wield power, it is incomplete. In particular, the
command-and-control model fails to account for the effects of
economic forces (namely, the free market ideas developed by classical
liberals like Adam Smith and John Locke). The neoliberal model of
governance is an attempt to respond to this deficiency. It combines the
political characteristics of the State developed in the command-andcontrol model with the free market of classical liberalism to produce a
regulated marketplace governance model.46
Importantly, the neoliberal model does not eschew the
centralized, top-down existence of the State. Under neoliberalism, the
State continues to decide the goals of governance, but markets are used
to execute those goals.47 Some neoliberal scholars use the analogy of
“steering” and “rowing”:48 the State steers the ship, while markets are
responsible for rowing it in the chosen direction.49 The State guides the
“rowing” by setting the rules of the market, policing the market for bad
actors, or even dictating the economic terms of the market by
contracting for market goods itself.50 Thus, both the Hobbesian model

44. LORRIN PHILIPSON & H. LEE WILLIS, UNDERSTANDING ELECTRIC UTILITIES AND
DE-REGULATION 94 (2d ed. 2006).
45. BAKKE, supra note 24, at 86–90.
46. WOOD & SHEARING, IMAGINING SECURITY, supra note 17, at 10.
47. Id. at 10–11.
48. See generally DAVID OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER, REINVENTING GOVERNMENT: HOW
THE ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT IS TRANSFORMING THE PUBLIC SECTOR (1992).
49. Shearing, Reflections on the Refusal to Acknowledge Private Governments, in
DEMOCRACY, SOCIETY, AND THE GOVERNANCE OF SECURITY, supra note 17, at 22; Wood &
Shearing, Security and Nodal Governance, supra note 17, at 2.
50. Wood & Shearing, Security and Nodal Governance, supra note 17, at 2–4.
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and the neoliberal model embrace top-down, hierarchical systems of
government, even if the neoliberal model also disaggregates power
from one form (political) into two (political and economic).51 Figure 2
presents a diagram of the neoliberal model; the blue arrows represent
political forces, while the red arrows represent economic forces.

Figure 2. Representation of a neoliberal governance framework.
Political power still flows from the top down (signified by the blue
arrows), but private actors can also interact with each other via
economic exchanges in regulated marketplaces (signified by the red
arrows). In this example, two separate marketplaces are shown.
Similarly, the conventional story of U.S. electricity grid
governance says that the second phase of grid governance began with
the development of the neoliberal model. That story proceeds as
follows: beginning in the late 1980s and early 1990s, after the electricity
industry had experienced external shocks to its system, policymakers
seized on the notion that the problem with the electricity system was a
failure to allow the free market to “row” the ship of low-cost electricity.
To remedy this, regulators set about dismantling the regulatory
compact in favor of a market-based approach.
The breakup of the utility monopoly began at the federal level. In
1992, Congress passed the Energy Policy Act, which directed the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to order utilities to
open up their interstate transmission lines so that any generator—as

51. Shearing, Reflections on the Refusal to Acknowledge Private Governments, in
DEMOCRACY, SOCIETY, AND THE GOVERNANCE OF SECURITY, supra note 17, at 21–22.

19. Gocke_ME Clean (Do Not Delete)

220

DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM

4/25/2019 12:42 PM

[Vol. XXIX:205

part of a regulated utility company or not—could sell their electricity
at the wholesale level.52 Shortly thereafter, FERC adopted Orders
88853 and 889,54 which mandated that all public utilities that owned or
operated interstate transmission facilities file “open access tariffs” with
FERC certifying that their transmission services would be run in a
“non-discriminatory” manner.55 By removing the exclusive franchise at
the generation level and putting in place incentives for independent
generators to enter into the market, Congress and FERC hoped to turn
electricity into a commodity—tradable on a competitive marketplace
just like any other good.56
Then, in 1999, FERC adopted Order 2000. This rule created
voluntary, independent transmission organizations in the form of
Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs) to manage the
transmission lines, develop long-term transmission planning, run
wholesale markets where electricity could be bought and sold in
competitive auctions, and ensure that access was enforced in a
nondiscriminatory manner.57 Two years later, FERC issued a Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking on Standard Market Design that would have
made participation in RTOs mandatory for all interstate buyers and
sellers of electricity.58
52. Jeffrey D. Watkiss & Douglas W. Smith, The Energy Policy Act of 1992 — A Watershed
for Competition in the Wholesale Power Market, 10 YALE J. REG. 447, 449 (1993).
53. Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory
Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and
Transmitting Utilities, Order No. 888, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,036 (1996), 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540
(1996) [hereinafter Order 888].
54. Open Access Same-Time Information System (formerly Real-Time Information
Networks) and Standards of Conduct, Order No. 889, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,037 (1996), 61
Fed. Reg. 21,737 (1996) [hereinafter Order 889].
55. See Order 888, supra note 53.
56. BAKKE, supra note 24, at 138.
57. Regional Transmission Organizations, Order No. 2000, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,089
(1999), 65 Fed. Reg. 810 (2000) [hereinafter Order 2000], on reh’g, Order No. 2000-A, FERC
Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,092, 65 Fed. Reg. 12,088 (2000) [hereinafter Order 2000-A].
58. See Remedying Undue Discrimination Through Open Access Transmission Service and
Standard Electricity Market Design, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,563 (2002), 67 Fed. Reg. 55,451
(Aug. 29, 2002). This proposed rulemaking was suspended in the wake of the California electricity
crisis and state resistance towards further deregulation of the electricity system. See Remedying
Undue Discrimination Through Open Access Transmission Service and Standard Electricity
Market Design, Order Terminating Proceeding, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 61,073 (2005), 70 Fed.
Reg. 43,140 (July 26, 2005); see also Mary Anne Sullivan, Joseph C. Bell, & John R. Lilyestrom,
Standard Market Design: What Went Wrong? What Next?, 16 ELECTRICITY J. 11 (2003).
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Meanwhile, the states were embarking on competitive retail
market efforts of their own. By 1991, thirty-six states had required their
regulated utilities to engage in a competitive bidding process to secure
additional generation capacity.59 In 1998, Massachusetts, Rhode Island,
and California set in place programs to break apart the utilities’ retail
monopolies and offer greater choice to customers.60 By 1999, according
to FERC, “twenty-one states had enacted electric restructuring
legislation, three had issued comprehensive regulatory orders, and
twenty-six states plus the District of Columbia had legislation or orders
pending or investigations underway.”61
California in particular approached the neoliberalization of the
retail market with fervor. In 1992, California’s PUC began exploring
options to open up the state’s private utilities to market competition.62
In 1996, California’s legislature passed Assembly Bill 1890, putting in
place several principles for electricity restructuring that would go into
effect in 1998: (1) direct access, allowing all customers to purchase
electricity from any provider, regardless of whether they fell within its
franchise territory; (2) the transfer of transmission operations to the
California Independent System Operator (CAISO), akin to FERC’s
RTO model; (3) the creation of the California Power Exchange (PX),
a “spot” market for wholesale electricity purchases open to both
investor-owned utilities and independent power generators; and (4) a
freeze on retail electricity rates set at 1996 levels in order to allow cost
recovery for utilities forced into a competitive market model.63 Under
California’s restructuring approach, the utilities were required to
divest at least 50% of their generation assets and were strongly
encouraged to divest the remainder.64 They were also banned from

59. Watkiss & Smith, supra note 52, at 454 n.28. The states had also already engaged in some
competitive wholesale expansion by adopting utility contracting requirements for non-utility
power wholesalers that were either cogeneration facilities or renewable energy generators. Id. at
452. This movement sprang from several seemingly innocuous lines in the 1978 federal Public
Utilities Regulatory Policies Act (“PURPA”), intended to encourage greater energy efficiency in
the wake of the oil crisis. Id.
60. Joskow, The Difficult Transition to Competitive Electricity Markets in the United States,
in ELECTRICITY DEREGULATION, supra note 43, at 32.
61. Order 2000, supra note 57.
62. JAMES L. SWEENEY, THE CALIFORNIA ELECTRICITY CRISIS 26 (2002). At the time,
investor-owned utilities served 78% of California customers. Id. at 7.
63. Act of September 23, 1996, 1996 Cal. Legis. Serv. 854 (codified at CAL. PUB. UTIL.
CODE §§ 330–398.5); Provisions of AB 1890, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
https://www.eia.gov/electricity/policies/legislation/california/assemblybill.html (last visited Apr.
5, 2018).
64. SWEENEY, supra note 62, at 61.
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securing generation via long-term, bilateral contracts; instead, they had
to conduct all of their wholesale electricity purchases on the spot
market or the CAISO wholesale market.65
The results were not encouraging. Wholesale market prices for
electricity in June and July of 2000 increased 270% from the same
period in 1999.66 The state experienced frequent rolling blackouts, with
almost 100 declared power emergencies in 2000 and more than 150 in
2001.67 One of California’s three largest investor-owned utilities,
Pacific Gas & Electric, declared bankruptcy in April 2001.68 To staunch
the bleeding, both California and FERC issued price caps; the
California PX was closed and utilities were permitted to once again
contract outside of the market for generation; and the California PUC
suspended direct access (or retail choice) in the state.69
In the wake of the California electricity crisis, whereas before
around half of the states had been exploring options to transition
towards retail competition or were in the early stages of doing so, only
fifteen soldiered on.70 FERC, having received backlash on its proposal
to convert all states to the regional wholesale market model, rescinded
its rulemaking. Although FERC continued to issue improvements in
RTO design and implementation, the concerted and enthusiastic effort
to move the electricity industry to a neoliberal framework stalled.
Today, the U.S. electricity grid sits in an ad hoc limbo, with some states
containing “restructured” retail markets, some governed by RTOs, and
some engaging in traditional ratemaking cases.71
This is where the conventional story of U.S. electricity grid
governance ends. With no alternative to the command-and-control
model or the neoliberal model, and with no ability to see the history of
grid governance as anything but the evolution between those two

65. Id. at 61–64; see also Frank A. Wolak, Lessons from the California Electricity Crisis, in
GRIFFIN & PULLER, ELECTRICITY DEREGULATION 145, 145–78 (2005).
66. Subsequent Events – California’s Electricity Crisis, U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION
ADMIN.,
https://www.eia.gov/electricity/policies/legislation/california/subsequentevents.html
(last visited Apr. 5, 2018).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.; see also Wolak, supra note 65, at 158–65; see generally SWEENEY, supra note 62.
70. Boyd, supra note 6, at 1668.
71. See Boyd & Carlson, supra note 12, at 818–38 (summarizing existing state of hybrid
electricity markets).
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models, legal scholars and policymakers are left debating the merits
and demerits of the two hierarchical governance systems.72 But as
critics tear apart the flaws of both governance systems as applied to the
electricity grid, and as neither system seems particularly well-suited to
govern the grid of today, no consensus for grid governance has
emerged. Meanwhile, problems facing the grid proliferate, and the grid
is left with no governing blueprint ready to bring it into the future.
II. NODAL GOVERNANCE AND THE U.S. ELECTRICITY GRID
While the conventional story of the electricity grid told in Part I
grasps some of the superficial elements of grid governance, it misses
the nuance and driving forces underneath. As a result, the narrative
provides little guidance for how policymakers and scholars should
approach grid governance moving forward. A new model of
governance is needed to understand how the grid actually functioned
in the past, and how it ought to function today. That is where nodal
governance comes into play. Nodal governance is a theory of
governance arising from the realm of international security law that
describes a decentralized model of decision-making.73 It recognizes
that a variety of actors, not just the State or the private sector
responding to economic incentives, have the ability to influence events
in the world. This decentralized model gives a more accurate historical
account of the grid and reveals power dynamics that are ignored in the
conventional story. As a result, it is more useful for describing the
electricity grid today, unearthing the kaleidoscope of players and
decision-making processes that actually dictate grid outcomes.
A. The Nodal Governance Model
Nodal governance is a governance model that developed in
international security law in order to account for the bevy of non-state
actors that wield force alongside the traditional conception of the
State.74 For nodal governance scholars, looking at the mass of private
72. See supra notes 12–16 and accompanying citations.
73. See supra note 17 and accompanying citations.
74. See id. While I rely heavily on the international security law literature for my nodal
governance model, the idea appears in other disciplines as well. See id. Many scholars have
recognized that non-hierarchical, decentralized, pluralistic governance models better describe the
landscape of power in the real world than stylized, top-down systems. But often these models are
discussed in the context of more traditional American institutional frameworks—for instance,
constitutional law, see Metzger, supra note 17, at 1373 (proposing “a new constitutional analysis
of privatization”), or administrative law, see Freeman, supra note 17, at 546 (observing that “[t]he
time has come” for “the discipline of administrative law to grapple with private power”). That is
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firms, think tanks, non-state actors, media organizations, political
parties, non-governmental organizations, and civil society entities that
populate the modern world, it was unrealistic to think that governing
power comes from just one source.75 Governance itself also must be
disaggregated. As one such scholar has explained:
What one has in practice is not a single model of governance, but a
complex of hybrid arrangements and practices in which different
mentalities of governance as well as very different sets of
institutional arrangements coexist. We have not simply witnessed a
shift away from direct command and control governance to forms of
indirect state governance that operate through market mechanisms
or through the gentle touch of persuasion associated with
third-sector mobilization. Rather, we have a complex set of
relationships in which ‘steerers’ and ‘rowers’ constitute relationships
and align their interests.76

When you tear apart the hierarchical conception of governance
entirely, you end up with a “nodal” view of governance.77 Under this
view, no one entity monopolizes governance decisions.78 Instead, a
variety of actors—legislatures, government agencies, neighborhood
associations, non-governmental organizations, firms, and media
conglomerates—use their expertise, resources, and technologies to set
governance goals. They then use economic, political, social,
informational, propagandistic, and other forms of power to “cajole,”
“coerce,” or otherwise direct those they wish to control to fall into
compliance with their aims.79 Moreover, under this view of governance,

not my focus. Instead, I am more interested in the construct of the grid’s nodal network itself:
what “nodes” and “networks” actually exist, and how they are leveraged to produce change. For
that reason, I draw primarily from the international security law literature, which is more
concerned with the actual scaffolding of the nodal network than with fitting such a network into
other legal frameworks. That is not to say that other literature on the topic is not relevant. Jody
Freeman’s theory of governance as “a set of negotiated relationships” that can include both
“private” and “public” actors, id. at 571, for instance, is an excellent description of what I am
interested in here—namely, how a variety of actors with their own interests and authority wield
their power to influence the governing choices of others.
75. WOOD & SHEARING, IMAGINING SECURITY, supra note 17, at 13; Burris, Drahos, &
Shearing, Nodal Governance, supra note 17, at 31–32.
76. WOOD & SHEARING, IMAGINING SECURITY, supra note 17, at 21.
77. Id. at 21–28; see also Orly Lobel, The Renewal Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise
of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 262, 297 (2004).
78. WOOD & SHEARING, IMAGINING SECURITY, supra note 17, at 21–28; Burris, Drahos, &
Shearing, supra note 17, at 47.
79. Burris, Drahos, & Shearing, supra note 17, at 39.
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the “time” of governance must be disrupted as much as its “space”: the
“nodes” and “networks” of people and power are “constantly
reconstituting themselves” as new organizations form and new
connections of influence are established in response to changing
environments and shifting alliances.80
The end result is a decentralized theory of governance that is best
represented as a collection of dots connected by a multitude of lines
rather than a hierarchical pyramid that assumes a single, dominant
point. A diagram of nodal governance is shown in Figure 3, in which
the multi-colored lines signify different forms of power that actors can
use to influence events in the world.

Figure 3. Representation of a decentralized nodal governance
framework. Power flows from a variety of different “nodes” (the blue
circles) or players across the network, some more powerful or
interconnected than others. The multi-colored arrows represent
different forms of power or influence—economic, top-down
regulatory, direct self-governance, informational, or social—that the
nodes can use to control events on the network.
B. A Revised Grid History
Revisiting the history of the U.S. electricity grid with the nodal
governance model in mind, it becomes clear that this model best
80. Id. at 40; Shearing & Wood, Nodal Governance, Democracy, and the New ‘Denizens,’
supra note 17, at 404.
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describes how governance and power were actually deployed on the
grid. In fact, a closer examination of grid history reveals the informal
nodes and networks that hummed outside of the formal legal systems
all along, and how these out-of-system actors kept the grid intact and
steered its course. Take the example of voluntary power pools and
small-scale independent generation sources. Both had tremendous
influence over events on the grid, yet neither are captured by the
standard governance narrative. Nonetheless, both fit seamlessly into
the framework of a nodal governance approach. These examples
demonstrate that the history of grid governance is best understood as
the constant evolution of a nodal governance model that has grown
more complex and interconnected over time, rather than a stepwise
transition from a command-and-control to a neoliberal model.
1. Voluntary Power Pools
One of the most prominent critiques of the conventional grid story
comes in the form of the voluntary power pools of the twentieth
century. As the conventional story would have it, the U.S. electricity
grid existed in a “highly balkanized” state during the command-andcontrol phase, during which each utility stayed within its own
monopoly jurisdiction.81 But in reality, very early on in the formation
of the grid, the electric utilities sua sponte created an interconnected
grid that saw utilities swapping electricity across jurisdictional lines and
defying the monopoly model. These interconnections, known as
“voluntary power pools,” were formed by utility operators seeking to
share engineering expertise and maintain grid stability. Eventually, the
pools morphed into informal wholesale markets and, later, into
regional markets overseen by FERC in the reforms of the 1990s. The
pools also represent a classic nodal governance relationship: private
firms acting independently to control events on the grid through means
other than top-down governance or market competition.
From almost the very beginning of the grid, the electric utilities
realized that some level of inter-coordination was necessary to keep

81. Severin Borenstein & James Bushnell, The U.S. Electricity Industry after 20 Years of
Restructuring 5–6 (Energy Inst. at Haas, Working Paper No. 252R, May 2015),
https://ei.haas.berkeley.edu/research/papers/WP252.pdf.
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the grid functioning.82 Reliability demands83 and the high costs of
creating and building new technologies84 convinced electricity
companies—without any pressure from centralized governance
systems—that they should design grid infrastructure that was
interoperable. That is, the technologies of each utility were compatible:
utilities’ transmission lines, interties, voltage converters, frequency
levels, and other systems could all be used by rival utilities. The
utilities’ organizational structures were compatible as well: the
companies developed communication channels between their
engineers and operators so that rival utilities could share generation
and transmission resources.85 As the historian Julie Cohn describes it,
in the early days of grid development, “thousands of engineers, system
operators, manufacturers, and academics” joined together to create
“information exchange networks” that “provided opportunities for
collaboration, critique, and the development of voluntary standards,
especially for power control and reliability,” all without the guidance
of “designated governing authorities.”86
Over time, these experts developed what they called “power
pools,” or cross-jurisdictional arrangements between utilities in which
the utilities aggregated their generation assets and determined the
least-cost configuration for dispatch at any given time87—in essence,
voluntary wholesale markets.88 The power pools operated differently
depending on the region: in the Pennsylvania-New Jersey pool, the
utilities organized an “operating agreement” under which “each
member utility designated one person to serve on an operating
committee, which then established the policies for operations,

82. See JULIE A. COHN, THE GRID: BIOGRAPHY OF AN AMERICAN TECHNOLOGY 21
(2017) (describing the example of the Southern California Power Company and the Redlands
Electric Light and Power Company in California, two separate companies in the early formation
of the grid who had their “own financial obligations to investors and [their] own customer base”
but nonetheless engaged in “[p]ower sharing” arrangements to aid in each other’s electricity
production and distribution).
83. Id. at 26.
84. CASAZZA & DELEA, supra note 23, at 5–6.
85. COHN, supra note 82, at 8; see also CASAZZA & DELEA, supra note 23, at 24.
86. COHN, supra note 82, at 27.
87. Catherine Wolfram, The Efficiency of Electricity Generation in the United States After
Restructuring, in ELECTRICITY DEREGULATION, supra note 43, at 227, 231; see also PHILIPSON
& WILLIS, supra note 44, at 49–50.
88. See Boyd & Carlson, supra note 12, at 831; Boyd, supra note 6, at 1674; Michael H.
Dworkin & Rachel Aslin Goldwasser, Ensuring Consideration of the Public Interest in the
Governance and Accountability of Regional Transmission Organization, 28 ENERGY L.J. 554
(2007).
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exchanges of energy, and forecasts of loads.”89 The operating
agreement even had member utilities share planning activities.90 Other
power pools were less formal. Some “used loose arrangements,
effected by a handshake”; some were regional; some operated only
within one state.91
These voluntary nodes were not just technically resourceful,
however; they were also politically nimble. For instance, during the
1940s, the Roosevelt Administration expressed interest in taking over
all of the regionally interconnected grids in order to further the war
effort.92 In response, the utilities formed more interties and tightened
their governance structures to prove that they could run the
interconnected grid without government oversight. The federal
government, acquiescing, waived its interstate jurisdiction and allowed
companies to continue to join regional pools without subjecting
themselves to federal control.93
Twenty years later, federal regulators again attempted to seize
oversight of the grid interconnections. They released a National Power
Survey in 1964 proposing that a national grid system and accompanying
governance and planning body be adopted.94 Anticipating the report,
the utilities united in 1963 to form the North American Power Systems
Interconnection Committee (“NAPSIC”), which—by interconnecting
seven existing power pools—created the largest synchronized grid in
the world.95 As Julie Cohn describes it:
With the creation of NAPSIC, the power industry had finally
established an entity that had eluded large utilities, politicians, and
engineers for decades. The independent interconnected systems
89. COHN, supra note 82, at 64.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 104; see also PHILIPSON & WILLIS, supra note 44 at 50 (“[U]tilities in both Texas
and California were pretty much linked together in pools which covered each state but did not
stray too far over state boundaries. Sometimes the pools covered multiple states, as for example
the power pool that interconnected utilities in New York and New England, or the Southwest
Power Pool, which was formed by utilities in Oklahoma, Arkansas, Louisiana, and parts of
surrounding states.”).
92. COHN, supra note 82, at 106, 108, 110. Hardware companies even developed to cater to
the special technological needs of grids that could be operated jointly or separately. Id. at 97–99.
93. Id. at 109–17.
94. Id. at 124; see also FED. POWER COMM’N, NATIONAL POWER SURVEY: A REPORT BY
THE FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION 1 (1964).
95. See COHN, supra note 82, at 143–44; N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., NERC
OPERATING MANUAL 1 (2016).
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created NAPSIC without fanfare, publicity, political endorsement,
or regulatory demand. NAPSIC served as a clearinghouse for
stability issues for all the power companies, both public and private,
that operated interconnected across the continent. In addition, at the
outset, NAPSIC provided a forum for a level of national grid
operation and some discussion of autonomous system plans
unprecedented in the industry’s history. Yet through its very
organizational structure, NAPSIC preserved the independence of
government agencies, privately owned utilities, municipal
companies, and rural cooperatives and respected the wide variety of
systems developing across the continent. NAPSIC was the
embodiment of shared responsibility and divided authority.96

NAPSIC and the power pools continued operating relatively
uninterrupted by government oversight for the next thirty years.97 It
was not until the 1990s (coinciding with the so-called neoliberal phase)
that the voluntary power pools were converted into formal structures
overseen by the federal government. As FERC began to push for
greater competition on the grid, regulators and industry participants
alike recognized that some form of a regional organizing body was
needed to manage load, dispatch, and capacity requirements without
discrimination. Instead of subsuming that responsibility under FERC
or creating new entities to manage transmission, FERC and the states
turned to the preexisting power pools.98 These pools formed the first
wholesale market operators that FERC eventually adopted and
converted into RTOs.99
There are two important observations to draw from this history of
the voluntary power pools. First, there was no clean two-phase period
in grid governance history marked by a “command-and-control” model
and a “neoliberal” model. The wholesale markets that FERC
implemented in the 1990s were not the brainchild of neoliberal
reforms; they were engrafted solutions that utilities and engineering
experts had been using to ensure grid stability and efficiency for almost
one hundred years (although they had expanded and transformed as
their roles developed under FERC orders). Second, the U.S. electricity
grid was populated by unconventional, decentralized nodes that
wielded power—through informational ties, political lobbying, and
96. COHN, supra note 82, at 146.
97. In 1980, NAPSIC was folded into the National Electric Reliability Council (“NERC”),
another voluntary regional organization that came about through the utilities’ own initiative. Id.
at 145, 167–70, 201. The formation of NERC is itself another excellent example of the network
governance operation of the grid.
98. Boyd & Carlson, supra note 12, at 831.
99. Joskow, The Difficult Transition to Competitive Electricity Markets in the United States,
in ELECTRICITY DEREGULATION, supra note 43, at 51.
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industry affiliations and collaborations—to influence events on the
electricity grid. Neglecting these nodes and networks of power leaves
out valuable information about the on-the-ground reality of grid
operation.
2. Independent Generation Sources
A similar story could be told with regard to independent
generation sources. The traditional narrative of grid governance says
that market competition increased under—and as a direct result of—
the neoliberal transition. Moreover, this narrative presumes that no
market competition existed during the command-and-control phase.
But in reality, a barely noticed, offhand section in a piece of 1970s
federal legislation that was intended to address energy efficiency
opened up the industry to competition decades before the deregulatory
efforts began within FERC. It was this statutory text that convinced
experts that wholesale competition could be beneficial and helped spur
the reforms of the 1990s. The independent generation sources
supported by the statute are again examples of unconventional nodes
unaccounted for in the standard governance models, despite their
enormous influence.
In 1978, Congress passed the Public Utilities Regulatory Policy
Act (PURPA) in response to the oil crisis of 1973.100 PURPA was
designed to encourage more efficient energy usage by promoting
cogeneration facilities101 and favoring electricity produced by nonfossil fuel generators (e.g., biomass, waste, geothermal, solar, and
wind).102
In particular, Section 210 of the Act—inserted by New Hampshire
Senator John Durkin, who had a cogeneration facility in his district that
needed a government boost103—said that utilities had to purchase
electricity from cogenerators or small-scale, non-fossil fuel power
producers if they cost the same as the “purchasing utility’s ‘incremental
cost . . . of alternative electric energy,’ i.e., the purchaser’s avoided cost

100. BAKKE, supra note 24, at 86–88.
101. Cogeneration involves the “simultaneous production of electric energy plus steam, heat,
or some other useful form of energy.” Watkiss & Smith, supra note 52, at 452 n.20.
102. Id. at 452 n.21.
103. BAKKE, supra note 24, at 96.
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to generate or purchase the same amount of electricity.”104 The
statutory language was merely intended to promote energy
conservation and reduce dependence on foreign oil; it was not meant
to impact grid governance.105 But—to the surprise of the utilities as well
as many policymakers—PURPA had an enormous effect on the
wholesale market for electricity. By requiring utilities to purchase
generation from small, independent sellers, PURPA broke the hold
that vertically integrated utilities exercised over the generation
market.106 As historian Phillip Schewe recounts: “[h]ere was something
new in the electricity business. A small company, an unregulated
company, could build modest generators and find a niche market. . . .
Here was an opportunity for an energy entrepreneur to fit into the
cracks between existing monopoly grid giants.”107 In fact, in the years
after PURPA passed, small-scale independent generators accounted
for more than half of new generation capacity built in the U.S.108
In retrospect, PURPA was one of the key factors responsible for
paving the way towards the reforms of the 1990s.109 First, the rapid
uptake of these generators proved that non-utility generation could
compete economically with utility generation, calling into question the
usefulness of a monopoly model.110 Second, PURPA’s mandate that
small-scale generators be used and compensated at the “avoided cost”
of an additional utility installation motivated many state regulators to
set costs via a competitive bidding process, foreshadowing today’s
wholesale market auctions.111 Third, PURPA forced regulators away
from the traditional cost-of-service ratemaking methodology and
encouraged the adoption of a more competitive pay-for-performance
standard.112 And finally, by focusing on avoided costs, PURPA
encouraged state regulators to consider a wider variety of tools—
including demand-side management—in reaching customer needs,
104. Watkiss & Smith, supra note 52, at 453 (footnote omitted) (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 824a3(b)). See also id. at 453 n.23.
105. Id. at 453 &n.25; BAKKE, supra note 24, at 86–87; SCHEWE, supra note 25 at 172.
106. BAKKE, supra note 24, at 95; see also Donna M. Attanasio, PURPA’s Public Power
Impact (And What to Do About It), 5 GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY & ENVT’L L. 1, 2 (2014).
107. SCHEWE, supra note 25, at 175.
108. Watkiss & Smith, supra note 52, at 454, 454 n.27.
109. See, e.g., Attanasio, supra note 106 at 1; BAKKE, supra note 24, at 87; FRANK GRAVES,
PHILIP HANSER, & GREG BASHEDA, EDISON ELEC. INST., PURPA: MAKING THE SEQUEL
BETTER THAN THE ORIGINAL 2 (2006); Watkiss & Smith, supra note 52, at 454.
110. Richard F. Hirsh, PURPA: The Spur to Competition and Utility Restructuring, 12 ELEC.
J. 64 (1999).
111. Id. at 66.
112. Id. at 67–69.
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thus expanding the range of potential participants in the business
beyond utility generators.113
Altogether, the PURPA example yet again demonstrates the
points made by the voluntary power pools: first, that history of grid
governance is best understood as the evolution, expansion, and
improvement upon preexisting models rather than the abrupt
transition between a “command-and-control” and “neoliberal” phase;
and second, that nodes unaccounted for in the standard governance
models nonetheless harnessed their own forms of power to influence
outcomes on the electricity grid. In the case of small-scale independent
generators, that form of influence was all the more unique, as the
generators were brought to life by a top-down mandate but survived
under free-market economic principles (before any such market
ostensibly existed).
The same story of the influence of decentralized nodes on the U.S.
electricity grid could be told about many grid entities.114 The takeaway
of each of these stories, though, is that power was not just wielded in a
top-down approach on the electricity grid, and that it was not just the
State (or the State and regulated markets) that dictated grid events.
Rather it was the actions of many decentralized actors, all of them
asserting control according to their own methods, all of them motivated
by their own governing aims, which “steered” and “rowed” the ship of
the electricity grid. It is this decentralized, nodal history of grid
governance that can provide the blueprint for how to understand the
governance of the electricity grid today.
C. The Topography of the Modern U.S. Electricity Grid
This revised grid history suggests that a better understanding of
grid governance requires a comprehensive analysis of all of the
potential nodes and pathways that influence events on the grid. Such
an analysis produces a decentralized network topography that
describes and directs grid governance. This mapping reveals that
113. Id. at 67, 69.
114. For instance: the regional coordinating councils and the formation of the National
Electric Reliability Council (“NERC”), see COHN, supra note 82, at 145, 167–70, 201; the longterm bilateral contracts that were prohibited during California’s restructuring period and helped
plunge the state into rolling blackouts, see SWEENEY, supra note 62, at 64–66, 74; and the TVA
and its “grassroots” approach to electrifying the rural South, see SCHEWE, supra note 25, at 94;
see supra note 41 and accompanying citations.
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electricity governance should not be conceived of as a command-orcontrol model, or a neoliberal one, but rather as a densely populated,
constantly evolving network of decentralized actors—one that has
grown more complex (with more nodes and networks introduced) over
time. This network is illustrated in Figure 4.

234
DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM

Figure 4. A map of the key players and paths of influence in modern electricity grid governance. The map reveals a decentralized,
nodal network model. The blue circles (“nodes”) represent the variety of actors that exercise control over the electricity grid. The
multi-colored arrows (“networks”) symbolize the different methods of influence that the nodes use to wield their power.
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Figure 4 is the visual representation of modern grid governance
under the decentralized model. All of the main players and paths of
power are included. Some are familiar from the history of the grid
recounted above; others are new entrants that have cropped up in the
last decade. Similar network relationships and means of influence have
been highlighted with colored arrows. This Part discusses these
relationships. For those interested in influencing grid events—for
instance, environmentalists looking to decarbonize the grid—each
relationship represents an opportunity to assert influence, some with
more likelihood of success than others.
1. Economic Competition
The red arrows represent a standard market-based or competitive
economic relationship. This relationship most often describes the
dynamic between buyers and sellers on the electricity grid.
Take sellers of electricity. Historically, this category was
dominated by the private investor-owned utility, which controlled
three-quarters of wholesale electricity sales in the country.115 Today,
after the reforms of the 1990s, private investor-owned utilities are
responsible for only one-tenth of total wholesale sales.116 The vast
majority of wholesale electricity sales (around 40%) have shifted to
merchant generators—owners and operators of natural gas plants,
nuclear power stations, hydropower and wind turbines, solar fields, and
coal plants—that operate outside of the utility structure.117 These
entities are the “Merchant Generator” nodes that appear in Figure 4.
Merchant generators sell their electricity in the wholesale markets
(labeled “Regional Wholesale Markets” in Figure 4), competing
alongside each other and other generation resources to offer the
lowest-cost electricity. Competitors can include leftover private utility
assets (the “Private Utility” node in Figure 4), federally owned
115. BAKKE, supra note 24, at 69–70.
116. This information comes from the U.S. Energy Information Administration’s Form EIA861 data file on “Operational Data.” See Electric Power Sales, Revenue, and Energy Efficiency
Form EIA-861 Detailed Data Files, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (2016),
https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia861/ [hereinafter Form EIA-861]. “Retail Sales” and
“wholesale sales” are taken from the EIA’s Disposition data on “Retail Sales” and “Sales for
Resale” in the same data file. Id. The EIA data aggregates electricity sales from eleven categories
of utilities, classified according to ownership: federal, cooperative, investor-owned, municipal,
municipal marketing authorities, political subdivisions, retail power marketers, states,
transmission, and “unknown” (a category that includes five community choice aggregators in
California). Id. The final category of ownership, “Behind the Meter,” was excluded in these
calculations and in the retail and wholesale sales percentages discussed in the paragraphs below.
117. See id.
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generation assets—like the four federal power marketing
administrations (PMAs) that generate electricity predominantly from
hydroelectric dams (labeled “Federal PMA” in Figure 4),118 or the New
Deal–era TVA119—as well as local generation owned or operated by
states, municipal utilities, public utility districts, or cooperative utilities
(represented by the “Municipal Utility” node).120
A new form of competitor has also recently been appearing in the
wholesale markets: the “distributed energy resource” (labeled
“Distributed Energy Resource” in Figure 4). This umbrella term
represents a variety of small-scale, customer-side generation assets—
often residential solar panels, cogeneration plants, or electric vehicles
or other battery storage technologies—that can either be used to fuel
a single household or, alternatively, aggregated together across
thousands of households to form one large “power plant” that can bid
into the wholesale marketplace.121 Depending on the jurisdiction,
distributed energy resources can also include demand response or
energy efficiency programs, which pay groups of customers to reduce
their energy usage.122 Distributed energy resources are relatively new
118. Id.; see generally Federal Power Marketing Administrations Operate Across Much of the
United States, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (June 12, 2013), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/
detail.php?id=11651.
119. SCHEWE, supra note 25, at 94; TVA At a Glance, TENN. VALLEY AUTH.,
https://www.tva.gov/About-TVA/TVA-at-a-Glance (last visited Mar. 28, 2018).
120. For instance, the U.S. Energy Information Administration (“EIA”) reports that in 2016,
eighteen municipal marketing authorities—nonprofit organizations that are created by the
residents of a municipality in order to create a public-private electricity partnership—accounted
for around 2% of total wholesale sales. See Form EIA-861, supra note 116, “Operational Data.”
More than one hundred public utility districts—which are “voted into existence by a majority of
the residents of any given area for the specific purpose of providing utility service to the voters,”
and which are independent of city councils or governments, see id., “861 2017 Instructions”—were
responsible for almost 3.5% of total wholesale sales, see id., “Operational Data.” Eighteen stateowned utilities, including entities like the California Department of Water Resources and the
New York Power Authority, provided around 2.3% of total wholesale sales of electricity. Id. And
cooperative utilities (a quasi-public, quasi-private form of nonprofit entities that are memberowned and -governed, often by rural communities or other community groups who were not being
adequately served by private investor-owned utilities, JIM LAZAR, THE REGULATORY
ASSISTANCE PROJECT, ELECTRICITY REGULATION IN THE U.S.: A GUIDE 10 (2011)), accounted
for almost 12% of total wholesale sales of electricity in 2016. See Form EIA-861, supra note 116,
“Operational Data.”
121. See FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N, DISTRIBUTED ENERGY RESOURCES: TECHNICAL
CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE BULK POWER SYSTEM: STAFF REPORT 5–10 (2018) (overview of
distributed energy resource technologies and definitions).
122. Id. at 7–8.
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assets in the wholesale markets,123 but they have the potential to disrupt
standard wholesale market operation by allowing decentralized, smallscale resources to compete against more traditional large-scale power
plants.
Sellers who do not participate in the wholesale markets are
nonetheless also motivated by economic considerations. Such sellers
often negotiate bilateral contracts directly with electricity buyers.
Bilateral contracts can be good options for buyers to hedge against
price volatility and ensure a long-term electricity supply; they are also
popular in those regions of the U.S. that did not transition to FERC’s
regional wholesale market model.124
The economic forces guiding both in– and out-of-market
purchases can also have a profound effect on events occurring on the
electricity grid. Over the last decade, for instance, the grid has seen a
dramatic shift away from higher-priced coal and nuclear power plants
towards lower-cost natural gas and renewable (i.e., wind and solar)
plants.125 Although market dynamics are not the only factor influencing
generation trends, fuel costs have been a crucial driver of this shift.126
123. The California Independent System Operator (“CAISO”), the market operator
responsible for overseeing California’s wholesale markets, has allowed distributed energy
resources to participate in the wholesale markets since 2016. California Independent System
Operator, 155 FERC ¶ 61,229 (2016). The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”),
the federal agency responsible for setting rules for most of the wholesale markets in the country—
California is one such market, but FERC oversees six others in the United States, OFFICE OF
ELECTRICITY DELIVERY AND ENERGY RELIABILITY, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, UNITED STATES
ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY PRIMER 26 (2015) [hereinafter U.S. ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY
PRIMER]—was expected to issue its own rules requiring distributed energy resource participation
in wholesale markets across the country, but has postponed that rulemaking for more factfinding.
Electric Storage Participation in Markets Operated by Regional Transmission Organizations and
Independent System Operators, Order No. 841, 162 FERC ¶ 61,127, at *4 (Feb. 15, 2018)
[hereinafter Order 841]. However, FERC has taken a piecemeal approach to distributed energy
resources, requiring wholesale market operators to accommodate specific distributed resources
like energy storage resources, id. at *3, and demand response programs, Demand Response
Competition in Organized Wholesale Energy Markets, Order No. 745, 76 Fed. Reg. 16,658 (Mar.
24, 2011) [hereinafter Order 745].
124. Most of the Southeastern and Western United States (except California) operates
without a regional wholesale market. See U.S. ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY PRIMER, supra note 123,
at 25–26.
125. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2018, at 83 (2018). In 2010,
coal was the dominant fuel source for electricity generation in the United States; today, natural
gas comes out ahead, with renewables falling close behind. Id.
126. Id. at 84 (“Fuel prices in the near term drive the share of natural gas-fired and coal-fired
generation.”); see also id. at 88 (“Coal-fired generation capacity decreases by an additional 65
GW between 2017 and 2030 [under EIA projection scenarios] as a result of competitively priced
natural gas and increasing renewables generation . . . . Higher natural gas prices . . . slow the pace
of coal power plant retirements . . . . Conversely, lower natural gas prices . . . increase coal power
plant retirements . . . .”).
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2. Direct Self-Governance
The green arrows represent opportunities for direct selfgovernance. There are a number of autonomous entities on the grid
that, unlike private utilities, are run by consumers for themselves. As a
result, these entities are often governed by a wider variety of concerns
than just the cost of electricity, such as environmental impact, selfsufficiency, reliability, and trendiness.
For instance, municipal utilities, public utility districts, municipal
marketing authorities, and cooperative utilities are all owned or
managed to some degree by the residents of the communities they
serve.127 Because these utilities are all public entities or not-for-profits,
and are often exempted from state and federal regulations,128 they can
prioritize their electricity purchases according to their members’ noneconomic preferences. For example, responding to member interest in
renewable energy, public utilities and cooperatives have driven
innovative energy projects like large-scale community solar plants.129
And cities like Georgetown, Texas130 and Boulder, Colorado131 are
using their municipal utilities to achieve residents’ demands for
renewable energy and energy efficiency.
Similarly, communities interested in self-run utilities but
dissuaded by the legal hurdles involved in forming them can turn to
Community Choice Aggregations (CCAs) (labeled as such in Figure
4). CCAs are stripped-down versions of municipal utilities that employ
private utilities for the maintenance of distribution lines, transmission

127. See generally DISTRIBUTED ENERGY RESOURCES, supra note 121.
128. See PHILIPSON & WILLIS, supra note 44, at 37.
129. See Herman K. Trabish, Utilities Take Note: Next Generation Utility-Led Community
Solar is Emerging, UTILITY DIVE (Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/utilities-takenote-next-generation-utility-led-community-solar-is-emergin/507289/; Thomas Gulley, Rural CoOps and Public Utilities Have Voluntarily Built Nearly 100MW of Community Solar. Here’s Why,
GREENTECH MEDIA (Aug. 14, 2017), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/ruralcoops-and-public-utilities-have-built-nearly-100mw-of-community-solar#gs.GOUa96A.
130. Georgetown Utility to be Powered by Solar and Wind Energy by 2017, GEORGETOWN
(Mar. 18, 2015), https://georgetown.org/2015/03/18/georgetown-utility-to-be-powered-by-solarand-wind-energy-by-2017/.
131. Alex Burness, Boulder’s Muni Lives as Voters Reaffirm Support for Local Electric
Utility, DAILY CAMERA (Nov. 7, 2017, 7:26 PM), http://www.dailycamera.com/boulder-electionnews/ci_31437049/boulder-municipalization-tax; Mark Jaffe, Boulder Wanted Its Own Electric
Utility. Does It Still?, DENVER POST (Oct. 27, 2017, 1:28 PM), https://www.denverpost.com/
2017/10/27/boulder-wanted-its-own-electric-utility-does-it-still/.
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lines, and billing systems, but still allow communities to manage their
own electricity contracts, build and run their own generation assets,
and develop distributed energy resource programs.132 CCAs are
relatively new and are only authorized in a few states.133 Nonetheless,
they have already become an explosive force in retail electricity sales.
In California, for instance, five CCAs alone served almost a million
customers by the end of 2017.134 And, like their public utility
counterparts, CCAs are often formed to serve communities’ clean
energy goals.135
Self-supply of electricity is also popular. In the corporate world,
large industrial or commercial customers may elect to build their own
generation sources, contract with independent generators, or purchase
credits that support energy development elsewhere. Recently,
corporations have been particularly active in the renewables markets,
buying up a record number of long-term renewable energy contracts
and energy credits136 to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, meet
sustainability goals, save money, and limit exposure to price
volatility.137
Finally, individual households may also engage in electricity selfgovernance. Depending on their own preferences—e.g., status or
brand loyalty, environmental concerns, energy independence, or
expense—residents can buy rooftop solar panels, energy efficient
appliances, smart thermostats, electric vehicles, battery storage, and
small-scale cogeneration facilities for their home.138
All told, these self-governing entities may eventually overtake
private investor-owned utilities’ retail dominance. In fact, according to
the California PUC, more than 85% of California customers are
predicted to be served by sources other than private investor-owned
132. Welton, supra note 15, at 308.
133. See CCA by State, LOCAL ENERGY AGGREGATION NETWORK (last updated Apr. 2018),
http://www.leanenergyus.org/cca-by-state/.
134. Herman K. Trabish, Join or Die: How Utilities Are Coping with 100% Renewable Energy
Goals, UTILITY DIVE (Dec. 13, 2017), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/join-or-die-how-utilitiesare-coping-with-100-renewable-energy-goals/512664/.
135. See id.
136. Corporations Purchased Record Amounts of Clean Power in 2017, BLOOMBERG NEF
(Jan. 22, 2018), https://about.bnef.com/blog/corporations-purchased-record-amounts-of-cleanpower-in-2017/0.
137. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, CORPORATE RENEWABLE ENERGY PROCUREMENT
SURVEY INSIGHTS 2 (2016).
138. In 2017, distributed generation installations amounted to an estimated 30,000 MW. FED.
ENERGY REG. COMM’N, supra note 121, at 7 fig.2. The number of annual installations is expected
to double by 2024. Id.
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utilities in less than a decade—the inverse of the state’s retail
consumption today.139 If that trend holds true for the rest of the
country, the number of nodes connected by green arrows on the grid
could multiply. Accordingly, electricity customers’ individual
preferences could increasingly influence electricity purchase decisions.
3. Indirect Self-Governance
The purple arrows represent opportunities for indirect selfgovernance. In this relationship, while a node may not directly dictate
the governing choices of another node on the grid, it can do so by
proxy.
For instance, consumers and state PUCs have an indirect selfgoverning relationship. While individual consumers are not directly
responsible for the governing choices made by PUCs, as public
agencies, these commissions are ultimately accountable to voters. That
means that consumers unhappy with how their electricity grid is being
governed may participate in public proceedings conducted by the
commission, contact their commissioners, contact their state
representatives (who appoint the commissioners), or ultimately vote
for new representation in the state legislature.
Similarly, aggregated distributed energy resources represent an
opportunity for indirect self-governance. Individual consumers with
rooftop solar, energy efficient appliances, electric vehicles, or battery
storage may use those resources to govern their own electricity
consumption directly. But they can also lend out those resources to a
third-party aggregator, who can indirectly bid those collective
resources into the wholesale markets. That aggregation allows the
choices of individual consumers to have a much larger effect on grid
governance.
4. Top-Down Regulation
The blue arrows represent a top-down regulatory relationship. As
recounted in the grid history above, there are two general levels at
which this happens: the state and federal level. The federal regulator
node in Figure 4 is labeled “FERC,” while the state node is labeled
“State PUC.” The electricity grid also has several quasi-public, quasi-

139. CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, supra note 18, at 3.
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private regional bodies that behave similarly to regulatory agencies,
including the regional wholesale markets. These bodies connect to
other entities via the blue arrows as well.
To begin at the state level: state nodes generally take the form of
PUCs. Because state retail competition efforts haphazardly collapsed
in the early 2000s, the PUCs perform different functions depending on
the state. In approximately fifteen states and the District of Columbia,
the PUCs supervise a competitive retail choice model, under which
customers can select their electricity provider with relative freedom
(signified by the pink arrow connecting the “Residential Consumer”
node to the “Private Utility” node).140 In seven states, retail choice
options have been suspended or rescinded, leaving a split between
regulated monopoly utilities and competitive retail options (signified
by the tan double-lined arrow connecting the “Consumer” node to the
“Private Utility” node).141 The remaining states function solely under a
regulated monopoly model (signified by the yellow arrow connecting
the “Consumer” node to the “Private Utility” node).
Through top-down regulation of private utilities, PUCs wield
enormous influence over the composition of the electricity grid. For
instance, PUCs often subsidize preferred forms of merchant
generation by requiring utilities to purchase electricity from specific
sources.142 Or, PUCs may direct utilities to achieve an energy savings
target each year. PUCs can also use their power over utilities to bring
new technologies onto the grid: for example, several states have
implemented energy storage mandates that require utilities to procure
a set quantity of battery storage,143 while others have used utility rate140. These states include Oregon, Texas, Illinois, Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Maryland,
Delaware, New Jersey, New York, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Connecticut, Massachusetts,
and Maine; Oregon and Michigan both only offer partial retail choice. See MATTHEW J. MOREY
& LAURENCE D. KIRSH, ELECTRIC MARKETS RESEARCH FOUNDATION, RETAIL CHOICE IN
ELECTRICITY: WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED IN 20 YEARS? 4, fig.1 (2016); JOHANNES
PFEIFENBERGER, THE BRATTLE GROUP, ELECTRICITY MARKET RESTRUCTURING: WHERE
ARE WE NOW? 9 (2016).
141. Those states are California, Arizona, Nevada, New Mexico, Montana, Arkansas, and
Virginia. See MOREY & KIRSH, supra note 140, at 3; PFEIFENBERGER, supra note 140.
142. Renewable Portfolio Standards are the most common of these policies. As of 2017,
twenty-nine states have adopted an RPS. Jocelyn Durkay, State Renewable Portfolio Standards
and Goals, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEG. (Aug. 1, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/
energy/renewable-portfolio-standards.aspx.
143. The most prominent examples of these include California’s mandate to its electric
utilities to procure 1300 MW of energy storage by 2020, Energy Storage, CAL. PUBLIC UTILITIES
COMM’N (last visited Apr. 20, 2018), http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/General.aspx?id=3462, and New
York’s mandate to procure 1500 MW of energy storage by 2025, Energy Storage in New York,
NYSERDA (last visited July 16, 2018), https://www.nyserda.ny.gov/All%20Programs/Programs/

19. Gocke_ME Clean (Do Not Delete)

242

DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM

4/25/2019 12:42 PM

[Vol. XXIX:205

setting mechanisms to encourage investments in carbon capture and
sequestration technologies.144 These command-and-control techniques
allow expensive technologies to build up economies of scale until they
can compete in the wholesale markets—an example of a blue arrow
transitioning to a red one.
State PUCs also influence events on the grid through various
licensing, rate-setting, and incentive programs that are directed at nonutility entities. For instance, state programs like net metering—a
method of rate-setting that allows owners of residential solar panels to
sell their excess electricity back onto the grid—can be the deciding
factor for whether distributed energy resources like rooftop solar are
economically viable.145 Similarly, state laws regarding energy
efficiency, demand response, battery storage, and other technologies
often dictate whether and how these resources can be aggregated to
bid into the wholesale markets. And innovative forms of retail-side
electricity governance, like CCAs, often require permission under state
law before they can be constituted. In fact, if the role of private utilities
diminishes in the future, state governance of unconventional electricity
sellers may become the key mechanism through which PUCs assert
control on the grid.
Moving on to the federal level: the primary federal node on the
grid, FERC, also uses top-down regulatory powers to dictate outcomes
on the electricity grid. FERC is charged with regulating wholesale sales
of electricity that occur across state lines, transmission, and several
other interstate electricity transactions.146 FERC exercises this power
through direct regulation of merchant generators, private utilities, and
distributed energy resources, as well as indirect regulation of these
entities via the regional wholesale markets.
FERC’s most important exercise of its top-down authority comes
in the form of rules regarding the operation of the regional wholesale
markets. As the number and type of electricity sellers and buyers has
increased on the grid, this gatekeeping function has grown in

Energy%20Storage/Achieving%20NY%20Energy%20Goals/The%20New%20York%20State
%20Energy%20Storage%20Roadmap.
144. See Boyd & Carlson, supra note 12, at 851–52 (describing Mississippi’s subsidies for a
clean-coal plant through favorable electricity rate treatment).
145. See id. at 862–63, 863 n.220.
146. See 16 U.S.C. § 824a–w.
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significance. That is, only several decades ago, the wholesale markets
were populated primarily by fossil fuel and nuclear plants. Now, FERC
is deciding whether and how to introduce new resources—like demand
response, renewable energy, battery storage, and distributed energy
resources147—into the marketplace. For instance, in 2011, FERC issued
a rule requiring market operators to allow demand response programs
to bid into the wholesale markets.148 More importantly, FERC directed
market operators to compensate demand response programs—which
are in essence promises to reduce rather than generate electricity—at a
rate equal to the clearing price for electricity.149 This rule gave
electricity savings the opportunity to compete on equal footing with
electricity generation in the wholesale market. Similar rules were
adopted in 2018 for energy storage.150
Moreover, FERC is not the only entity to use its regulatory
authority to influence the power flows in the marketplace. In many
cases, the regional market operators do not wait for FERC’s dictates;
they set market rules on their own and receive FERC’s approval at the
tail end of the process. In Figure 4, the “Regional Wholesale Market”
nodes thus have their own blue arrows linking to the “Merchant
Generator,” “Distributed Energy Resource,” “Private Utility,”
“Community Choice Aggregation,” and “Municipal Utility” nodes—
arrows representing their own regulatory power functionally (if not
formally) distinct from that of FERC.
There are nine RTOs that oversee the grid’s transmission lines.151
These regional market operators are tasked with running transmission
in a nondiscriminatory manner.152 They determine who can participate
in the markets, set the clearing price for electricity, and dispatch
electricity to meet demand. They also manage congestion on the

147. See supra Part II.C.1 for a definition of these resources.
148. See Order 745, supra note 123.
149. See C.F.R. § 35.28(g)(1)(v)(A).
150. Order 841, supra note 123, at *3–4.
151. Technically, these RTOs are properly broken down into “RTOs” and “ISOs.” RTOs
and ISOs are functionally very similar, except that ISOs (which preceded FERC’s orders creating
RTOs) either may not meet the four minimum characteristics and eight minimum functions
required for RTOs, or the ISO may not have petitioned FERC for RTO status. U.S. ELECTRICITY
INDUSTRY PRIMER, supra note 123, at 25–26 (2015); see also 18 C.F.R. § 35.34(j)(1)–(4). For
simplicity’s sake, I refer to them all as “RTOs” here.
152. See Dworkin & Goldwasser, supra note 88, at 551–52. The open access rule stems from
the following FERC Orders: Order 888, supra note 53; Order 889, supra note 54; Preventing
Undue Discrimination and Preference in Transmission Service, Order No. 890, FERC Stats. &
Regs. ¶ 31,096 (2007), 72 Fed. Reg. 12,266 (2007) [hereinafter Order 890]; and Order 2000, supra
note 57.
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transmission lines, ensure adequate long-term generation resources,
and provide a variety of ancillary services that support the grid.153
Coincident with their origin as voluntary power pools, the market
operators have acquired an unusual structure. They are private entities
that come into existence by the voluntary agreement of regional
stakeholders.154 They are run by corporate-like boards of directors155
who cannot have financial interests in the transmission, generation, or
distribution assets that they oversee.156 FERC created these operators
to encourage greater competition within the electricity markets but, in
the process, essentially granted the RTOs a monopoly over the
dispatch and transmission of electricity.157
5. Collaboration & Negotiation
The orange arrows represent opportunities for collaboration and
negotiation between regulatory nodes on the grid. In most cases, this
occurs where a pathway for top-down, command-and-control
regulation exists, but the parties have opted for a more collaborative
relationship.
Take the orange arrow connecting the “Regional Wholesale
Markets” node to the “FERC” node in Figure 4. Technically, FERC
has the power to dictate how the market operators run the wholesale
markets. In reality, the process tends to contain much more back-andforth: market operators develop rules for market management, submit
those rules to FERC for input, and then refine their policies based on
FERC’s response. In some cases, market operators may even originate
a rule and test it out in their jurisdiction, with FERC later making that
policy (once proven successful) mandatory across all of the wholesale
markets. In fact, that is exactly what happened in the case of energy

153. FERC specified the ancillary services RTOs are responsible for providing in Order No.
888. See Order 888, supra note 53.
154. Dworkin & Goldwasser, supra note 88, at 556.
155. These boards can include representatives from state regulatory agencies, public
consumer advocacy organizations, public and private utilities, independent power producers and
other merchant generators, environmental groups, and transmission operators. For an overview
of the stakeholder board composition of the nine RTOs/ISOs, see CAL. INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR,
TABLE OF STAKEHOLDER COMMITTEES OF OTHER ISOS AND RTOS (2014),
https://www.caiso.com/Documents/ISO-RTO_CommitteeStructures-Oct2014.pdf.
156. Dworkin & Goldwasser, supra note 88, at 553.
157. Id. at 555.
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storage: California’s wholesale market operator developed a
mechanism for incorporating energy storage into its wholesale
markets, the policy was tested out in California’s market for several
years, and just in 2018 FERC issued a rule requiring all wholesale
market operators to include energy storage within their markets.158
State PUCs also have the opportunity to collaborate and negotiate
with the regional and federal nodes on the grid, as indicated by the
orange arrows connecting these nodes in Figure 4. First, states often
include representatives from their PUCs on the market operators’
stakeholder governance board; in fact, in some regional markets, state
representatives can even approve market rules prior to their
enactment.159 Second, some state PUCs work closely with market
operators to align their policy preferences. Again, California provides
the best example of this: the California wholesale market operator has
collaborated with the California PUC to integrate renewable energy
and distributed energy resources into the grid, often by jointly planning
price mechanisms, transmission infrastructure, and capacity
requirements.160
6. Lobbying
The black dotted arrows represent opportunities for lobbying or
political influence. The relationship is similar to that indicated by the
orange arrows, but highlights the informal influence wielded by private
entities instead of public ones. Most often, this includes private utilities
or merchant generators lobbying state PUCs, the regional market
operators, or FERC in order to give themselves a competitive
advantage.
Private utilities are particularly adept at convincing state PUCs
and FERC to subsidize expensive infrastructure investments with
uncertain futures and to deter competition from new forms of energy
resources. For instance, in South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida,
lobbying by the utility companies led the states’ PUCs to allow the
utilities to recover the costs of the construction of floundering nuclear
and clean coal projects before the projects were even online.161

158. See Order 745, supra note 123, and accompanying citations.
159. See supra note 155 and accompanying citations.
160. See infra Part III.B.1.
161. See Tony Bartelme, Power Failure: How Utilities Across the U.S. Changed the Rules to
Make Big Bets With Your Money, POST & COURIER (Dec. 10, 2017),
https://www.postandcourier.com/news/power-failure-how-utilities-across-the-u-s-changed-the/
article_434e8778-c880-11e7-9691-e7b11f5b3381.html.
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In Arizona, aggressive lobbying by the utility companies had the
state remove its net metering program for rooftop solar technologies,
thereby also removing one of the utility’s prime competitors.162 At the
federal level, as FERC contemplates rules for allowing distributed
energy resources to compete in the wholesale markets, utilities have
been jockeying to be given the final say on whether those resources can
bid into the marketplace, a position that would essentially allow
utilities to decide the economic future of their competition.163
Merchant generators also lobby state and federal regulators. For
instance, owners of nuclear power plants, which have suffered in recent
years due to low natural gas and renewable energy prices, have
appealed to the states to subsidize their generation. They achieved
some success in New York, Illinois, Connecticut, and New Jersey (with
efforts currently stalled in Ohio and Pennsylvania).164 Coal plant
owners are similarly pushing both the states and the federal
government for support.
Under the Trump Administration, coal plants have even pushed
FERC and the DOE to use various “emergency” powers to provide
financial support to struggling plants.165 Some of these efforts can

162. See Julia Pyper, Arizona Vote Puts an End to Net Metering for Solar Customers,
GREENTECH MEDIA (Dec. 21, 2016), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/arizonavote-puts-an-end-to-net-metering-for-solar-customers#gs.2UoScnI.
163. Utilities assert that this power is needed in order to prevent potential threats to the
operation of the distribution lines. See Gavin Bade, Utilities, DER Providers Face Off Over
Market Access at FERC Meeting, UTILITY DIVE (Apr. 12, 2018), https://www.utilitydive.com/
news/utilities-der-providers-face-off-over-market-access-at-ferc-meeting/521197/.
164. See generally Peter Maloney, Exelon, FE Nuke Closures Would Reverse PJM Wind,
Solar Benefits: Brattle Report, UTILITY DIVE (Apr. 17, 2018), https://www.utilitydive.com/
news/exelon-fe-nuke-closures-would-reverse-pjm-wind-solar-benefits-brattle-re/521468/; Gavin
Bade, New Jersey Passes Bills for Nuke Subsidies, 50% RPS, 2 GW Storage Target, UTILITY DIVE
(Apr. 13, 2018), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/new-jersey-passes-bills-for-nuke-subsidies-50rps-2-gw-storage-target/521314/; Robert Walton, Dominion Threatens Millstone Closure if Plant
Shut Out of Support Program, UTILITY DIVE (July 10, 2018), https://www.utilitydive.com/
news/dominion-threatens-millstone-closure-if-plant-shut-out-of-support-program/527364/;
Robert Walton, AEP Supports FirstEnergy Push for Zero-Emission Nuclear Credits in Ohio,
UTILITY DIVE (Mar. 9, 2017), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/aep-supports-firstenergy-pushfor-zero-emission-nuclear-credits-in-ohio/437734/.
165. Brad Plumer, Trump Orders a Lifeline for Struggling Coal and Nuclear Plants, N.Y.
TIMES (June 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/01/climate/trump-coal-nuclearpower.html; Robert Walton & Gavin Bade, FirstEnergy Asks DOE for Emergency Action to Save
PJM Coal, Nuke Plants, UTILITY DIVE (Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/
firstenergy-asks-doe-for-emergency-action-to-save-pjm-coal-nuke-plants/520280/.
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translate into reconfigurations of grid governance that threaten the
existence of other nodes on the grid.
***

The nodes and networks described above dictate how our
electricity grid functions. They set its priorities and control its
outcomes. Some nodes are more powerful than others, exercising
control over larger swaths of the electricity grid. Some are wealthier
than others. Some are more populous. Some have more paths for
influence than others, and some maintain networks that are innately
more powerful. Each of these players influences how our grid is run to
some degree, and changes in the number or type or role of nodes and
networks inevitably change the nature of our electricity grid.
III. THE BENEFITS OF A NODAL ELECTRICITY GRID
The nodal grid presented in Part II is not only descriptively
accurate, but also useful as a guide for solving grid governance
problems. First, the nodal topography of the grid reveals the potential
benefits that flow from having a diversity of nodes and networks—
benefits that we often associate with other forms of decentralized
governance. And second, these overlooked actors can offer solutions
to policy issues that, thus far, a top-down approach has been unable to
solve. For instance, California’s proposal to regionalize its electricity
grid has faced pushback because of concerns about who would govern
the regional grid in a top-down manner. Federal action to decarbonize
the electricity grid has been conspicuously absent for decades, at least
in part because of fears of a top-down federal carbon tax or cap-andtrade program. A nodal governance approach suggests a way to move
beyond these debates by empowering unconventional nodes on the
grid and leveraging the grid’s nodal benefits to achieve certain policy
outcomes. Indeed, the Green New Deal—a recent proposal to, in part,
decarbonize the electricity grid—looks a lot like what one might expect
under a nodal governance framework.
This is not to say that there are not downsides that come with the
nodal grid. The nodal grid raises obvious concerns about inefficiency,
unequal distribution of power, inertia, and a lack of systemwide
thinking. It would be useful, in another paper, to think about ways to
mitigate some of these concerns while still maintaining the benefits.
But for now, this article focuses on sketching out some of the upsides
of a nodal network approach, particularly because they are not
immediately obvious.
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A. The Governance Benefits of a Nodal Grid
Many of the governance benefits that come from a nodal
electricity grid are akin to those found in decentralized governing
systems.166 For instance, scholars often extoll the benefits
decentralization offers in the form of preference maximization;
competition and the minimization of externalities; policy
experimentation; local governance; and minority rule and dissent.167
This section provides an overview of how some of these conventional
benefits apply to the U.S. electricity grid. The overview is not meant to
be exhaustive or in-depth, but it does provide a useful framework for
thinking about why the complex nodal network described in Part II is
preferable to a more streamlined, top-down system.
1. Maximizing Preferences
One of the most commonly cited benefits of decentralized
governance is that it allows citizens to maximize their preferences.
Imagine a single, centralized governing body choosing between two
options based on majority rule. The option with the greatest total
support wins. Then imagine if that same governing body is split up into
smaller units, with each unit capable of selecting its own option.
Assuming that the preferences are distributed unevenly amongst the
smaller sites, with some units favoring the “majority” option and others
the “minority,” overall utility is maximized in the decentralized system
rather than the centralized one.168

166. That is not to say that a nodal governance system is the exact same as any other
decentralized system. Under nodal governance theory, the nodes and networks can be fluid,
unstable, and multi-layered. By contrast, more conventional decentralized systems, e.g., the
American federalist system, have relatively static boundaries for their governing bodies and
governing mechanisms. Nonetheless, many of the same benefits that we see in decentralized
systems—which we often associate with democratic governance—are equally applicable to nodal
electricity governance.
167. Many of these benefits are discussed in the context of federalism. For just a tip of the
iceberg, see, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, ‘A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers’: In
Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752, 774–79 (1995); Erwin Chemerinsky,
The Values of Federalism, 47 FLA. L. REV. 499, 525–30 (1995); Barry Friedman, Valuing
Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 318–20, 387–404 (1997); Heather K. Gerken, Foreword:
Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 6 (2010); Larry Kramer, Understanding
Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1490 (1994); Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating
the Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1491–1511 (1987).
168. See McConnell, supra note 167, at 1494.
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A decentralized grid similarly offers greater likelihood that
individual consumers will be able to maximize their electricity
preferences. Imagine a single, top-down electricity grid: one form of
grid governance would predominate based on majority preference.
Then picture a nodal grid (in its idealized form): consumers interested
in actively managing their electricity consumption can choose to
participate in municipal utilities, cooperatives, CCAs, or similar selfgoverned nodes. They can supply their own electricity through
distributed energy resources, energy efficient appliances, smart-home
devices, and (if they are large commercial or industrial consumers)
direct contracts with generators. Within each of these nodes,
consumers can then select the electricity generation choices that satisfy
their priorities such as sustainability, cost, local job provision, etc.
Alternatively, if consumers prefer to leave their electricity
consumption choices to others, they can purchase electricity from a
private utility and cede governing control in return for less hassle.
More choices are available on the nodal grid than the centralized one.
For instance, in regional wholesale markets, the nine market
operators have created very different market dynamics depending on
their stakeholder preferences. The California wholesale market
operator has been active in incorporating distributed energy resources
into the grid,169 building transmission infrastructure that supports
higher renewable energy resource penetration,170 and designing a
“greenhouse gas emissions bidder” that puts a price on carbon for all
resources bidding into the California wholesale market,171 which is
essentially a carbon tax for the electricity sector. Meanwhile, the
eastern states’ market operators have adopted rules that favor more
traditional fossil fuel and nuclear power plants, citing concerns over
reliability and the intermittent generation that comes with wind and
solar resources.172

169. California’s wholesale market operator is the first (and as of right now, the only) market
operator to allow distributed energy resources to participate at the wholesale level. California
Independent System Operator, 155 FERC ¶ 61,229 (2016).
170. See CAL. INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR, 2017-2018 TRANSMISSION PLAN 19–28 (2018).
171. See CAL. INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR, EIM GREENHOUSE GAS ENHANCEMENT: DRAFT
FINAL PROPOSAL 6 (2017).
172. See, e.g., PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 151 FERC ¶ 61,208 (2015) (adopting capacity
market rules that disfavor renewable generation out of an expressed concern for reliability);
Advanced Energy Mgmt. All. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 860 F.3d 656, 661–62 (D.C.
Cir. 2017) (upholding the rules as not arbitrary or capricious).
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2. Competition and Minimization of Externalities
Decentralized governing systems also offer the opportunity for
competition and the minimization of externalities. Competition
operates horizontally: the existence of multiple different nodes across
the same level of governance allows those nodes to compete with each
other on the basis of governance outcomes, with the hope that
government becomes “more responsive by putting the States in
competition for a mobile citizenry.”173 Minimization of externalities
operates vertically: the governing node that is best able to internalize
both the costs and benefits of a given policy exercises jurisdiction over
those policies, with smaller nodes responsible for local issues and larger
ones tasked with overseeing national priorities.174 That way, each node
oversees policies that either benefit or burden its constituency equally.
The same holds true for the nodal electricity grid. A diverse range
of utility models (e.g., public, private, rural cooperative, CCA, etc.),
generation and conservation nodes (which compete economically with
each other in the regional wholesale markets), and state regulatory and
ratemaking regimes encourages horizontal competition. Consumers or
generators who are unhappy with their existing nodes can switch to
different jurisdictions or different generation sources, with the hope
that the “best” node outcompetes its rivals. CCAs are a perfect
example of this: the demand for self-governed municipal utility nodes
was high, but the legal hurdles required to form such nodes dissuaded
consumers from selecting them. So, CCAs were developed, which
offered many of the same benefits as municipal utilities without the
same regulatory costs. Horizontal competition between different utility
models thus leads to the creation of a new governing node that fits
consumers’ demand.
Meanwhile, externality minimization operates through FERC and
the regional wholesale markets. If the electricity grid consisted of only
local governing nodes, the costs and benefits of electricity generation
173. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991); see generally THOMAS R. DYE,
AMERICAN FEDERALISM: COMPETITION AMONG GOVERNMENTS (1990); Friedman, supra note
167, at 387.
174. For instance, McConnell explains how the existence of externalities argues for national
defense and water pollution regulation and treatment decisions to occur at the national, rather
than local, level. McConnell, supra note 167, at 1495. But see Heather K. Gerken & Ari Holtzblatt,
The Political Safeguards of Horizontal Federalism, 113 MICH. L. REV. 57, 78–98 (2014) (arguing
that “spillovers” between states is a feature, not a bug, and therefore may not require correction).
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would be borne by small, localized groups of consumers. But that may
be an inherently inefficient system if the benefits and the costs of
electricity generation could be distributed over a larger consumer base.
FERC and the regional wholesale markets—governing nodes that
capture a larger swath of the population—reduce exactly this
inefficiency. For instance, by allowing generators to compete across
regional marketplaces, the wholesale markets distribute the costs of
generation across a larger population. The wholesale markets also
allocate the costs of transmission lines and security, resiliency, and
reliability standards throughout the region. Additionally, if the
wholesale market has a greenhouse gas “bid adder” (as the California
market does), the environmental costs of generation can be borne by
the region as well.
3. Policy Experimentation
Decentralization is also associated with policy experimentation—
Justice Brandeis’s “laboratories of democracy.” According to
Brandeis, “[i]t is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that
a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk
to the rest of the country.”175 Decentralized governing units provide
opportunities for citizens to develop tailored solutions to local
problems, invest in and refine those solutions at a small scale, and then
enumerate “best practices” for similar problems occurring in other
jurisdictions or at a national level.176
Likewise, the nodal grid allows experimentation in grid
technologies and management techniques. For example, California’s
enthusiasm for solar energy led it to support solar technologies through
tax benefits, net metering, solar mandates, rebate programs, and
creative third-party ownership models. These policies reduced the cost
of solar technologies, spurred innovation in the field, and enabled solar
to spread to other states.177 A similar story could be told for wind

175. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
176. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 339–418 (1998) (analogizing the private sector’s
approach to best practices management to the American bureaucracy initiated under the New
Deal).
177. See, e.g., Easan Drury et al., The Transformation of Southern California’s Residential
Photovoltaics Market Through Third-Party Ownership, 42 ENERGY POL’Y 681, 689 (2012)
(attributing solar growth to state-supported third-party ownership schemes); Jonathan E. Hughes
& Molly Podolefsky, Getting Green with Solar Subsidies: Evidence from the California Solar
Initiative, 2 J. ASS’N ENV’TL & RES. ECON. 235 (2015) (finding that California’s Solar Initiative
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technologies promoted by states in the West and Midwest and
(although the technology is still in its nascent economic stages) carbon
capture and sequestration in the South.178 Without the heavy earlystage investment by local jurisdictions in certain technologies, these
technologies may not have developed.
Similarly, electricity management techniques benefit from a
decentralized grid. The division of governance authorities has allowed
states to test out varying degrees of retail competition and rate
structures; local communities to experiment with municipal utilities,
cooperatives, and CCAs; and regional grid operators to try out
different market mechanisms, such as greenhouse gas bid adders and
wholesale-side distributed energy resources. If these techniques prove
successful, they can be adopted by others or scaled up to the federal
level. Again, FERC’s recent rules regarding energy storage
participation in the wholesale markets present the perfect example:
these rules were developed, tested out, and refined by the California
wholesale market operator first before being scaled up for all of the
regional wholesale markets operating under FERC’s jurisdiction.179
4. Local Governance
Decentralization is often celebrated for its ability to promote local
governance. As Richard Briffault explains it, this “localism” enables
citizens to participate in the political process, develop distinct
communities with their own histories and values, and respond more
effectively to matters of local concern.180
Similarly, people have more opportunities to engage in local
governance on a nodal grid than on a centralized one. Public utilities
run by cities, municipalities, and communities all involve some form of
public vote for their formation. Once created, they are managed either
directly by consumers or indirectly via city councils or other public
was responsible for more than 50% of the rooftop solar installations in the state).
178. Boyd & Carlson provide a good overview of some of these, as well as other, state-based
experiments. See Boyd & Carlson, supra note 12, at 841–79.
179. See supra Part II and supra note 123 and accompanying citations.
180. Richard Briffault, Localism and Regionalism, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 15–18 (2000); see also
David J. Barron, A Localist Critique of the New Federalism, 51 DUKE L.J. 377, 377–78 (2001)
(describing local governance as associated with the “attractive values” of “protecting localized
decisionmaking” and “promoting responsive and participatory government by bringing the
government closer to the people”).
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bodies. Such entities can empower local communities to engage in selfgovernance beyond simply electricity governance.
The best example of this comes from one of the older nodes on the
U.S. electricity grid: the TVA. This New Deal–era program was a
massive infrastructure project intended to electrify the rural South and
lift millions of people out of poverty through a “grassroots” approach
to governance.181 Although the TVA originated from federal
legislation and was supported by federal dollars, it was implemented
primarily at the local level: hundreds of newly formed, municipallyowned distribution plants and rural cooperatives built and then
managed their own distribution systems in order to tap into the
electricity supplied by federal power plants.182 Communities then
paired this distribution with local employment, labor union
development, and the creation of farming cooperatives and
neighborhood libraries.183 Though the success of the TVA dwindled
over the decades and never quite reached the lofty democratic goals
set for it,184 the program nonetheless suggests more opportunities may
lie for leveraging local electricity nodes to produce a wider range of
governance outcomes.
Self-governing utilities also allow communities to form their own
set of values with regard to electricity governance. For instance, cities
like Georgetown and Boulder and the CCAs in California have used
self-governance to declare and further their environmental goals.185
181. See Dabid Ekbladh, “Mr. TVA”: Grass-Roots Development, David Lilienthal, and the
Rise and Fall of the Tennessee Valley Authority as a Symbol for U.S. Overseas Development, 19331973, 26 DIPLOMATIC HIST. 335, 336–44 (2002) (describing the early vision of the TVA as a “grass
roots” model of democratic governance).
182. WILSON WHITMAN, DAVID LILIENTHAL: PUBLIC SERVANT IN A POWER AGE 24
(1948).
183. DAVID LILIENTHAL, THE JOURNALS OF DAVID E. LILIENTHAL VOLUME I: THE TVA
YEARS (1939-1945), at xxix (1964) (“[B]y stimulating a far broader participation in labor unions,
farm cooperatives, the management of relief, recovery, and security, conservation and
development enterprises, [the TVA] enlarged the concept of democracy and the scope of its
operation.”); see also SCHEWE, supra note 25, at 97–98 (describing the TVA’s goal of “bolster[ing]
local cultural activities such as the construction of libraries and the development of adult
education classes”). But see Melissa Walker, African Americans and TVA Reservoir Property
Removal: Race in a New Deal Program, 72 AGRICULTURAL HIST. 1877 (1998) (describing how
African American communities were neglected in and harmed by the program’s vision of white
rural community development).
184. See generally CREESE, supra note 41, at 95–124 (describing the struggle and eventual
decline of the TVA as a source of democratic governance when the program’s emphasis shifted
to mass electricity production for the war effort); Ekbladh, supra note 181, at 345 (“Power
production focused on industry eventually became an end in itself rather than simply an offshoot
of other programs, leaving some to feel the TVA had moved away from its origins.”).
185. See supra Part II and notes 129–34 and accompanying citations.
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Similarly, self-supply by corporations, college campuses, and individual
households can encourage local governance entities to assert greater
control over their electricity consumption, adopt solutions suitable to
their particular concerns, and express values related to conservation,
environmentalism, self-sufficiency, and independence.
5. Minority Rule and Dissent
Finally, decentralization offers opportunities for minority rule and
what Heather Gerken terms “dissenting by deciding.”186 Decentralized
governing units allow national minorities to become local majorities;187
and, assuming that those governing units wield some degree of
autonomy, those units can express their disagreement with the national
majority by enacting policies opposed to the majority position.188 Those
dissenting policy positions could shift the goalposts in the national
conversation, prepare the national minority’s governing platform
should the tides shift, or, at the very least, achieve local victories in
contentious issues.
A decentralized electricity grid similarly offers the chance for
people to “dissent” from the governance of the broader electricity
network. If a consumer disagrees over how electricity is generated,
distributed, or sold, he or she can disconnect from the grid and supply
his or her own electricity. A decentralized grid also allows organized
ways to express dissent. For example, consumers’ and private
corporations’ purchases of solar, wind, or battery resources can be
signals of discontent with the lack of environmentally-friendly
generation sources on the larger grid. Movements to form municipal
utilities or CCAs can be expressions of a community’s dissatisfaction
with how its private utility has run its electricity grid in the past. When
President Trump pulled out of the Paris Climate Agreement in 2017,
more than fifteen states, 455 cities, 1700 businesses, and 300 institutions
of higher learning in the U.S. affirmed their commitment to the
Agreement’s goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by pledging to
reduce their own carbon footprints—promises that are only possible if
states, cities, local governments, and private entities are in charge of

186. See generally Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745 (2005).
187. Gerken, supra note 167, at 12 n.10.
188. Id. at 60–61; Gerken, supra note 186, at 1759–97.

19. Gocke_ME Clean (Do Not Delete)

Spring 2019]

4/25/2019 12:42 PM

NODAL GOVERNANCE

255

their own electricity procurement.189 Without the variety of
consumption and generation nodes available on a decentralized grid,
dissenters would not be able to turn their private or public
disagreement into organized action that can itself influence events on
the grid.
B. The Policy Benefits of a Nodal Electricity Grid
There are also policy benefits to a nodal governance approach to
the electricity grid. Nodal governance gives policymakers and other
actors on the grid the ability to skirt traditional centralized institutions
in favor of sub-state entities, private actors, nonprofits, and other
unconventional nodes to solve governance problems when formal
institutions have stalled. This section discusses two such examples:
California’s movement to regionalize its electricity grid, and a Green
New Deal–style program to decarbonize the electricity grid.
1. The Regionalization of California’s Electricity Grid
One of the best examples of the policy benefits of a nodal
governance approach to the electricity grid is California’s current
debate over whether to regionalize its electricity grid. Some California
lawmakers favor regionalization because it may reduce greenhouse gas
emissions and electricity rates for California consumers. Others are
concerned that regionalization could disrupt California’s efforts to
make its grid greener. A nodal governance approach to regionalization
may help move this effort, which has been dragging for several years,
in a new direction.
A quick background on California’s regionalization debate:
California has been leading the effort to reduce the carbon emissions
from the electricity sector, passing a Renewable Portfolio Standard,190
a carbon cap-and-trade bill,191 an energy storage mandate,192 and a
variety of energy efficiency and distributed energy resource incentives
intended to promote energy savings and solar and battery

189. BLOOMBERG PHILANTHROPIES, AMERICA’S PLEDGE: STATES, CITIES, AND
BUSINESSES IN THE UNITED STATES ARE STEPPING UP ON CLIMATE ACTION, at 18 fig.ES-1A
(2017).
190. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 399.11(a).
191. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38566.
192. Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Order Instituting Rulemaking Pursuant to Assembly Bill 2514
to Consider the Adoption of Procurement Targets for Viable and Cost-Effective Energy Storage
Systems: Decision Adopting Energy Storage Procurement Framework and Design Program,
D.13-10-040, at *2 (Oct. 3, 2013).
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technologies.193 So far, the state has managed to support these policies
without severe disruption to its electricity grid, primarily because
California has an in-state-only wholesale market operator, CAISO.
Importantly, unlike any of the other FERC-overseen wholesale market
operators, CAISO’s governing board is composed of appointees of the
California governor and legislature.194 Thus CAISO’s leadership has a
strong interest in promoting California’s environmental and energy
policies through its operation of the wholesale markets.
But as the state approaches more aggressive renewable energy
targets, to satisfy its electricity demands, it is finding that it increasingly
must look outside of the state—particularly to renewable generation
sources in the Pacific Northwest, Midwest, and Southwest, as well as to
out-of-state consumer markets that can take up some of California’s
excess generation during peak solar periods. As a result, some state
officials have been pushing the California legislature to convert
CAISO to a regional grid operator—one that would run wholesale
electricity markets not just for California, but for the surrounding
western states as well.195 According to a CAISO-sponsored study,
regionalization could offer significant environmental and economic
benefits.196 But it would come at a price: the governance board of

193. For a summary of California’s existing policies promoting distributed energy resources
and how the state plans to integrate them moving forward, see CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N,
CALIFORNIA’S DISTRIBUTED ENERGY RESOURCES ACTION PLAN: ALIGNING VISION AND
ACTION (2016).
194. The California ISO was created by California legislation and has a five-member
oversight board, with three of those members appointed by the Governor of California, one
member appointed by the Speaker of the California Assembly, and one member appointed by
the Senate Committee on Rules. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 336(a)(1)–(3).
195. See, e.g., Gavin Bade & Peter Maloney, California Dems Look to Restart CAISO
Regionalization With 11th Hour Amendments, UTILITY DIVE (Sept. 12, 2017),
https://www.utilitydive.com/news/california-dems-look-to-restart-caiso-regionalization-with11th-hour-amendm/504701/; Ivan Penn, California Wants to Reinvent the Power Grid. So What
Could Go Wrong?, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/20/business/
energy-environment/california-energy-grid-jerry-brown-plan.html; Ivan Penn & Chris Megerian,
Lawmakers Move to Add Other States to Oversight of California’s Electric Grid, L.A. TIMES (Sept.
11, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-regional-electricity-grid-20170911-story.html;
Julia Pyper, Can California Achieve 100% Renewable Electricity by 2040? Jerry Brown Thinks So,
GREENTECH MEDIA (Dec. 15, 2017), https://www.greentechmedia.com/squared/read/california100-renewables-2040-governor-brown#gs.F2ixOjM.
196. Pursuant to California law, CAISO recently completed a study on the costs and benefits
that a regional ISO would offer for the grid and the state’s environmental policies. CAL. INDEP.
SYS. OPERATOR, SENATE BILL 350 STUDY: THE IMPACTS OF A REGIONAL ISO-OPERATED
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CAISO would have to transition from a state-appointed body to one
that contains representatives from all of the participating states.
That change in leadership could create complications for
California’s sovereignty over its environmental policies. There is the
risk that a regional grid operator (containing representatives from less
environmentally focused states) may not be as willing to support
California’s environmental goals as CAISO. In fact, due to this risk,
conversations surrounding California grid regionalization have been
stalled for three years.197
But that is where a nodal governance approach to the electricity
grid could be helpful. Instead of looking to the states and the wholesale
market operator, we might look to private nodes on the grid as sites of
governance. After all, a regional grid is beneficial primarily because it
would allow California customers to purchase electricity from a wider
array of out-of-state sources, and it would allow California generators
to sell electricity to a wider array of out-of-state customers. Why not
empower these private nodes to purchase and sell electricity to each
other without relying on the states or grid operator to act first?
Such a proposal would entail CAISO designing procedures for
individual out-of-state generators or end-users to bid into its existing
wholesale markets, without having to bring an entire state’s electricity
system into the fold. Merchant generators, public and private utilities,
and even aggregated distributed energy resources could request and,
assuming that they meet pertinent market rules and regulations, be
granted access to CAISO’s wholesale markets. The western states
could maintain a gatekeeping role for their own in-state utilities and
distribution-side resources by deciding whether to permit those entities
to bid into CAISO’s markets. Meanwhile, CAISO’s structure would
remain the same, mitigating some regionalization opponents’ concern
that FERC oversight would expand.

POWER MARKET ON CALIFORNIA (2016), http://www.caiso.com/Documents/SB350Study_
AggregatedReport.pdf. Overall, the report estimated that California ratepayers would receive an
annual electricity cost savings benefit ranging from $55 million a year to $1.5 billion a year from
regionalization, depending on how many states are included and how far out the timeline is set.
Id. at viii–ix. The study also estimated that the state would see lower greenhouse gas emissions
for electricity serving California load under a regionalization scenario. Id. at ix–xi. Cf. Penn &
Megerian, supra note 195 (quoting representatives from the Utility Reform Network, the Sierra
Club, and the American Wind Energy Association California Caucus saying that regionalization
could support out-of-state fossil fuel resources to the detriment of renewable generation).
197. Jeff McDonald, Plan to Expand California Electricity Grid Powers Up for Third Time in
as
Many
Years,
SAN
DIEGO
UNION-TRIBUNE
(Feb.
23,
2018),
http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/business/sd-me-grid-regionalization-20180223-story.html.
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In fact, such a proposal has already been adopted on a small scale
within CAISO. In 2014, CAISO created the Western Energy
Imbalance Market (EIM), a real-time-only regional electricity market
that balances last-minute electricity supply and demand needs for
CAISO and seven utilities operating in eight states and parts of
Canada.198 The Western EIM functions much as described above,
except on a much more limited scale.199 Nonetheless, the program has
managed to secure cost-savings totaling around $330 million for its
participants since the initiative started; and CAISO estimates that, in
the first quarter of 2018 alone, approximately 28,000 metric tons of
carbon dioxide emissions were displaced as a result of the renewable
generation made available through the regional market.200
If CAISO expands the Western EIM model, the market could
approximate many of the benefits that a regional grid operator would
bring while avoiding some of the sovereignty issues that come with a
regional governing board. If the benefits of such integration prove
successful, they could encourage a more formalized process for
interjurisdictional management sanctioned by the states and the
federal government, much as the RTO model grew out of the early
power pools.
2. The Green New Deal
Moreover, a nodal governance perspective may already be making
inroads into grid policy debates. Federal action on climate change has
been stalled for the last several decades. But in February 2019, the
national conversation over electricity decarbonization took a turn with
the introduction of House Resolution 109 (the “Green New Deal”).201
The Green New Deal—at least in its preliminary form—looks a lot like
what one would expect from a nodal governance-style solution to
electricity decarbonization.
For instance, H.R. 109 calls for a “10-year national mobilization”
to “achieve net-zero greenhouse gas emissions” by acting with and
198. About, W. ENERGY IMBALANCE MKT., https://www.westerneim.com/Pages/About/
default.aspx (last visited Feb. 11, 2019).
199. For instance, participants are not currently allowed to bid into CAISO’s day-ahead or
long-term flexibility/capacity markets.
200. CAL. INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR, WESTERN EIM BENEFITS REPORT: FIRST QUARTER
2018 3 (2018), https://www.westerneim.com/Documents/ISO-EIMBenefitsReportQ1_2018.pdf.
201. H.R. Res. 109, 116th Cong., 1st Session (Feb. 7, 2019).
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through the decentralized governing nodes of the grid.202 The
Resolution proposes:
• “leveraging funding and providing investments for
community-defined projects and strategies,”203
• “building or upgrading to energy-efficient, distributed, and
‘smart’ power grids,”204
• “providing and leveraging, in a way that ensures that the
public receives appropriate ownership stakes and returns on
investment, adequate capital (including through community
grants, public banks, and other public financing), technical
expertise, supporting policies, and other forms of assistance
to communities, organizations, Federal, State, and local
government agencies, and businesses working on the Green
New Deal mobilization,”205
• “directing investments to spur economic development,
deepen and diversify industry and business in local and
regional economies, and build wealth and community
ownership,”206 and
• “ensuring the use of democratic and participatory processes
that are inclusive of and led by frontline and vulnerable
communities and workers to plan, implement, and administer
the Green New Deal mobilization at the local level.”207
In other words, the Resolution calls for funding from the federal
government, but locates decision-making within a variety of state, substate, local, private, and nonprofit actors.208 In particular, the
Resolution favors local nodes run by poor and minority communities.
Those nodes appear to have significant flexibility to select the
means by which they wish to achieve their goals. The Resolution sets
the broad goal of “meeting 100 percent of the power demand in the
U.S. through clean, renewable, and zero-emission energy sources.”209
202. Id. at 5–6.
203. Id. at 7.
204. Id. at 8.
205. Id. at 11.
206. Id. at 12.
207. Id. at 12.
208. See David Roberts, There’s Now an Official Green New Deal. Here’s What’s in It., VOX
(Feb. 7, 2019), https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2019/2/7/18211709/green-new-deal
-resolution-alexandria-ocasio-cortez-markey (“[S]omething like two-thirds of the [Green New
Deal] requirements, depending on how you count, direct political power and public investment
down to the state, local, and worker level . . . .”).
209. H.R. Res. 109, at 7.
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It does not mandate that this goal be achieved through solely a
command-and-control or neoliberal marketplace model—as would be
the case if, say, the plan called for a carbon tax or issued a nationwide
ban on coal plants. Instead, the Resolution sets a loose standard that
invites nodes to select their preferred methodology. By characterizing
the energy sources as “clean, renewable, and zero-emission,” the
Resolution leaves a whole menu of generation options open—ranging
from nuclear to hydroelectric to (theoretically) zero-emission coal with
carbon capture and sequestration technology. This framework suggests
that the agenda for decarbonization will be set community by
community, node by node.
Of course, the Resolution is still a draft, and a sparse one at that.
But the plan appears to recognize that solving a problem like climate
change—or, in this narrow context, decarbonization of the electricity
grid—is as much a governance problem as anything else. Leveraging
the benefits of our nodal grid—particularly its opportunities for policy
experimentation and local governance—to achieve larger policy goals
could be a step in the right direction.
IV. THREATS TO THE NODAL GRID
The benefits outlined above suggest that a nodal governance
approach to the electricity grid could provide a fruitful model for the
grid’s pressing problems. But such an approach has been threatened by
recent developments in electricity law jurisprudence. Over the last few
years, the U.S. Supreme Court and FERC have been interpreting the
Federal Power Act in a manner that elevates the wholesale markets
above any other governing node on the grid. This interpretation breaks
from both the structure of the Federal Power Act—which itself reflects
the nodal and interconnected nature of the electricity grid—and the
approach that the Supreme Court has taken to FERC’s governing
authority in the past, which has typically respected the importance of
cooperation and balance between governing nodes. This interpretive
change could lead to a concentration of power within FERC and,
concomitantly, a decrease in the power of other nodes.
A. The Federal Power Act and the Nodal Grid
First, a quick overview of the Federal Power Act. The Act divides
regulatory authority between the states, the federal government, and
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public and private utilities—consistent with the nodal governance
approach described above. In fact, the Act specifically carves out space
for cooperative and voluntary relationships between a diversity of grid
entities. And it repeatedly emphasizes the need for collaboration
rather than unilateral, top-down decision-making.
For instance, the Act declares that it is public policy that FERC
shall have regulatory authority over “the transmission of electric
energy in interstate commerce and the sale of such energy at
wholesale,” and that FERC’s powers extend “only to those matters
which are not subject to regulation by the States.”210 Thus, FERC is
given jurisdiction over transmission, wholesale sales of electricity, and
facilities that engage in either.211 The states maintain jurisdiction over
“any other sale of electric energy” (including, most prominently, retail
sales), as well as facilities used for generation, local distribution,
intrastate transmission, and self-supply.212 From the outset, then, the
Act recognizes that both FERC and the states play vital governing
roles on the grid (with, arguably, FERC’s powers constrained by those
exercised by the states).
The Act also acknowledges the governing presence of public and
private utilities. The Act excludes from its regulations all utilities
owned by “the United States, a State or any political subdivision of a
State, [or] an electric cooperative.”213 These entities remain free to selfregulate without FERC’s interference. And the Act reserves a role for
private utilities as well. For instance, although FERC is charged with
ensuring that the wholesale rates set by utilities are “just and
reasonable,”214 private utilities remain free to negotiate bilateral
contracts setting those rates for themselves.215 FERC also must
consider reliability standards “used by, or suggested for use by, the
electric utility industry.”216 The Act leaves it up to the private utilities
to create the “voluntary interconnection and coordination of facilities
for the generation, transmission, and sale of electric energy.”217
The Act also repeatedly emphasizes the need for consultation and
cooperation between governing nodes. For instance, before

210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

16 U.S.C. § 824(a).
Id. § 824(b)(1).
Id.
Id. § 824(f).
Id. § 824d(a).
Id. § 824d(c), (d).
Id. § 824a-2(a)(2)(F).
Id. § 824a(a).

19. Gocke_ME Clean (Do Not Delete)

262

4/25/2019 12:42 PM

DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM

[Vol. XXIX:205

segmenting the country into regional districts for grid interconnection,
FERC must “give notice to the State commission of each State situated
wholly or in part within such district, and shall afford each such State
commission reasonable opportunity to present its views and
recommendations, and shall receive and consider such views and
recommendations.”218 Before directing any utility to connect its
transmission lines to other utilities, FERC must give notice to the state
PUC and the utility, provide opportunity for a hearing, and establish
that “no undue burden will be placed” on the utility.219 FERC is
prohibited from compelling utilities to open up their transmission lines
if that would “impair [the utility’s] ability to render adequate services
to its customers.”220 FERC may only prescribe rules encouraging the
adoption of cogeneration and other small, non-fossil-fuel generators
after “consultation with representatives of Federal and State
regulatory agencies” and after “public notice and a reasonable
opportunity for interested persons (including State and Federal
agencies) to submit oral as well as written data, views, and
arguments.”221 And FERC has the general power to “refer any matter
arising in the administration of” the FPA to a board of relevant State
representatives, who are “vested with the same power” as FERC.222
Altogether, these provisions recognize an overlapping, multinodal electricity grid built on cooperation and communication.
B. The Supreme Court’s Historic Respect for Nodal Governance
The Supreme Court has historically been respectful of the Act’s
nodal structure, while still allowing FERC wide discretion in how it
undertakes its statutory responsibilities.
For instance, in Connecticut Power & Light v. Federal Power
Commission, one of the Court’s earliest cases addressing jurisdiction
under the Federal Power Act, the Court explained that “the fact that a
local commission may also have regulatory power [over an electricity
facility] does not preclude exercise of the Commission’s functions.”223

218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

Id.
Id.
Id. § 824a(b).
Id. § 824a-3(a)(2).
Id. § 824h(a).
Conn. Power & Light v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 324 U.S. 515, 533 (1945).
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The Court cited approvingly to the congressional record, which
explained that the Act was “designed to secure coordination on a
regional scale of the Nation’s power resources” and “conceived
entirely as a supplement to, and not as a substitution for State
regulation.”224 And Congress intended for the Act to “reconcile the
claims of federal and of local authorities and to apportion federal and
state jurisdiction over the industry”225—an intent that the Court must
take into account.226
In the years that followed, the Supreme Court upheld regulatory
schemes that required the involvement of multiple different governing
nodes. It held that private companies’ bilaterally negotiated wholesale
rates carry a presumption of lawfulness subject to FERC’s ultimate
oversight.227 It allowed state PUCs, alongside the federal Rural
Electrification Administration, to regulate rural cooperatives as a
matter of “legitimate local public interest[].”228 It affirmed state PUCs’
ability to set retail rates but required them to incorporate FERCapproved wholesale rates in their cost calculations in order to give full
force to both parties’ rate-setting responsibilities.229 It upheld FERC’s
ability to implement an “open-access” transmission policy—allowing a
new bevy of nodes to gain access to the grid—while permitting the

224. Id. at 525 (quoting Hearings on H.R. 5423, House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 384).
225. Id. at 531.
226. According to the Court: “Congress is acutely aware of the existence and vitality of these
state governments. It sometimes is moved to respect state rights and local institutions even when
some degree of efficiency of a federal plan is thereby sacrificed. Congress may think it expedient
to avoid clashes between state and federal officials in administering an act such as we have here.
Conflicts which lead state officials to stand shoulder to shoulder with private corporations making
common cause of resistance to federal authority may be thought to be prejudicial to the ends
sought by an act and regulation more likely to be successful, even though more limited, if it has
local support. Congress may think complete centralization of control of the electric industry likely
to overtax administrative capacity of a federal commission. It may, too, think it wise to keep the
hand of state regulatory bodies in this business, for the ‘insulated chambers of the states’ are still
laboratories where many lessons in regulation may be learned by trial and error on a small scale
without involving a whole national industry in every experiment.” Id. at 530.
227. This is known as the “Mobile-Sierra doctrine” and was developed in two cases issued in
the same term: United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv. Corp., 350 U.S. 332 (1956), and
FPC v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 350 U.S. 348 (1956). See also Morgan Stanley Capital Grp. Inc. v.
Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 554 U.S. 527, 530–34 (2008) (explaining and reaffirming the Mobile-Sierra
doctrine).
228. Ark. Elec. Coop. v. Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 375, 394 (1983) (quoting
Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery, 499 U.S. 456, 473 n.17 (1981)).
229. Entergy La. Inc. v. La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 539 U.S. 39, 49–50 (2003); Miss. Power &
Light Co. v. Mississippi, 487 U.S. 354, 371–73 (1988); Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg,
476 U.S. 953, 970 (1986).
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states to maintain jurisdiction over retail-side transmission.230 The
Court also repeatedly explained that FERC, “within the limitations
imposed by pertinent constitutional and statutory commands,” must
“devise methods of regulation capable of equitably reconciling diverse
and conflicting interests.”231
C. The Court’s Recent Disruption of Nodal Governance in EPSA and
Hughes
In the last few years, however, the Supreme Court has taken a new
approach to the Federal Power Act that threatens to upend the existing
nodal grid. This shift stems from two cases decided in 2016: Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission v. Electric Power Supply Ass’n
(EPSA)232 and Hughes v. Talen Energy Marketing, LLC (Hughes).233
In EPSA, the Court was faced with how to define FERC’s jurisdiction
on a nodal grid that is increasingly intertwined. In Hughes, the Court
confronted the same question with regard to the states. Instead of
adopting the same approach to both cases, however, the Court took a
functional and permissive attitude to FERC’s governing authority,
while simultaneously cabining states’ governing power within
formalistic constraints.
1. FERC v. EPSA
In EPSA, the Court addressed whether FERC had jurisdiction
under the Federal Power Act to regulate demand response bids made
in the wholesale marketplace.234 The case presented a thorny
jurisdictional issue. On the one hand, wholesale demand response bids
(i.e., bids submitted into the wholesale markets by consumers to reduce
their electricity consumption) consist of wholesale market transactions.
These transactions would typically fall under FERC’s jurisdiction. On

230. New York v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n, 535 U.S. 1, 7–11, 16–17, 25–26 (2002).
231. Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 767 (1968). See also Morgan Stanley
Capital Grp. Inc., 554 U.S. at 532 (“We have repeatedly emphasized that the Commission is not
bound to any one ratemaking formula . . . . But FERC must choose a method that entails an
appropriate ‘balancing of the investor and the consumer interests.’” (quoting FPC v. Hope Nat.
Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944)).
232. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Electric Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760
(2016).
233. Hughes v. Talen Energy Marketing, LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288 (2016).
234. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 767.
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the other hand, the bids involved consumers promising to reduce their
retail consumption for a price set by FERC, which would ordinarily fall
to the states to regulate.
The Court chose to resolve this issue by taking a functional
approach to FERC’s regulatory authority. First, according to the
Court, the Act gives FERC jurisdiction over wholesale rates, including
“rules or practices that ‘directly affect the [wholesale] rate.’”235
Demand response bids directly affect the wholesale rate because they
influence the wholesale supply and demand curves.236 Thus, FERC has
jurisdiction over demand response bids.237
Second, the Court held that FERC’s regulation of demand
response does not intrude on the states’ retail jurisdiction because the
purpose of FERC’s demand response regulations is to “improv[e] the
wholesale market.”238 The Court explained that “[t]he retail market
figures no more in the Rule’s goals than in the mechanism through
which the Rule operates.”239 Because the Court adopted a functional
approach to the FPA, the end goal of the regulation, not the means,
was what mattered. Even though FERC was setting the rate at which
retail actors received compensation for their non-consumption, it was
not regulating retail rates.240
In fact, the Court went even further. The Court held that, not only
did it not matter that FERC’s regulation operated through the retail
markets, but also it was entirely irrelevant that the demand response
bids had retail-side effects.241 According to the Court, “[w]hen FERC
regulates what takes place on the wholesale market, as part of carrying
out its charge to improve how that market runs, then no matter the
effect on retail rates, [the FPA] imposes no bar.”242 FERC need not
even consider the impact of its regulation on retail rates because “[t]hat
is of no legal consequence.”243

235. Id. at 774 (emphasis in original) (quoting Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp. v. FERC, 372
F.3d 395, 403 (D.C. Cir. 2004)).
236. Id. at 774.
237. Id. at 774–75.
238. Id. at 776.
239. Id. at 777.
240. Id. at 776 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1599
(2015)).
241. Id. at 776.
242. Id. (emphasis added).
243. Id.
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2. Hughes v. Talen Energy Marketing, LLC
In Hughes, the Court addressed whether Maryland could
subsidize an in-state generation facility by (1) directing in-state utilities
to enter into long-term contracts with the facility, (2) requiring the
facility to bid its capacity244 into one of FERC’s wholesale capacity
markets, and (3) making the utilities pay the facility at a rate contingent
upon the price that the facility received in the wholesale market.245
Again, Hughes presented a jurisdictional puzzle: under the FPA, states
have jurisdiction over generation facilities. But FERC retains
jurisdiction over the wholesale rates that generators receive for their
electricity sales. The problem was how to draw the jurisdictional line
on an electricity grid where generation facilities and wholesale markets
overlap.
Given its approach in EPSA, one might expect that the Court
would take the same functional approach to resolve Hughes, looking
to the target and purpose of the state program to determine whether it
was lawful. Not so. First, the Court acknowledged that Maryland’s
“traditional authority” gave it jurisdiction over “in-state generation.”246
And the purpose of the Maryland program—”attempting to encourage
construction of new in-state generation”—was “legitimate.”247 But it
concluded that the “means” by which Maryland sought to accomplish
that goal was unlawful.248 Specifically, the Court held that because
Maryland required the generation facility to bid into the capacity
market, then had in-state utilities pay the facility “a rate distinct from
the clearing price” set by the market, Maryland “invade[d] FERC’s
regulatory turf”249—even though, like the demand response rules at
issue in EPSA, the wholesale market acted as no more than the
mechanism through which the Maryland program operated.
Understanding the formalistic distinctions made in Hughes
requires some discussion of the nuances of electricity capacity markets.
Capacity markets are markets for the total amount of long-term

244. Capacity indicates the total amount of electricity a generator is able to sell over the long
term, rather than split-second generation.
245. Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1292, 1294–96 (2016).
246. Id. at 1299.
247. Id. at 1298.
248. Id.
249. Id.
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available generation in a region. They work as follows: wholesale
market operators calculate future demand projections, often several
years in advance, for the entire region. They then divvy up that demand
between all of the distribution utilities in the region. Each utility must
purchase an amount of capacity proportional to its share of future
customer demand. At the same time, generators in the region submit
bids for their expected future supply. The utilities buy their requisite
capacity from these bids. The price (rate) for capacity is set by the
market.250
Now, utilities may also satisfy their capacity requirements by
purchasing electricity directly from generators through a bilateral
contract. In those contracts, the parties buy long-term electricity supply
and set the rates themselves. In order to account for the capacity
covered by these contracts, utilities are required to bid any bilateral
contracts they hold into the capacity marketplace. Usually, utilities bid
those contracts in at some nominal price ($0) to ensure that they clear
the market, as the utilities have already purchased the capacity. The
utilities then, outside of the FERC-run market, pay the generators the
rate agreed to in the bilateral contract.251 Notably, states will often
mandate that their in-state utilities enter into bilateral contracts in
order to encourage investment in certain forms of generation. (Many
state renewable energy policies, for instance, operate in this manner.)
From this explanation, it should be clear that the Maryland
program at issue in Hughes functioned much the same as a bilateral
contract. But FERC has “long accommodated” bilateral contracts in
its markets—a practice that the Hughes Court endorsed.252 So what
made the programs different? According to the Court, Maryland’s
program required the generation facility to submit its capacity into the
marketplace, whereas for bilateral contracts, it was the utility that did
so.253 The Maryland program “operate[d] within the auction” in a
manner that interfered with FERC’s jurisdiction.254 But both the
Maryland program and the bilateral contracts had the exact same effect
on the wholesale market rate. The Court was thus primarily concerned
with the precise formal entity that bid the contracts into the wholesale
capacity market, rather than the effect that the contracts had on
market-based capacity prices. This stands in stark contrast to the
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

Id. at 1293.
Id. at 1293–94.
Id. at 1299.
Id.
Id.
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Court’s approach in EPSA, where it disregarded formalistic
distinctions so long as the purpose of the program was FERC-related.
We are left, then, with an EPSA-based approach to FERC
jurisdiction under the Federal Power Act where FERC has free rein to
regulate, without regard to the effect of its policies on other parts of
the market, so long as it targets rules and practices that “directly affect”
the wholesale markets. Meanwhile, states must take a Hughes-based
approach and be especially wary of the precise ways in which their
regulations intersect with the wholesale markets. FERC’s governing
power is thus elevated above that of the states in a manner inconsistent
with the structure and language of the Federal Power Act and the
Court’s historical approach to electricity grid jurisprudence. By
employing two different approaches with regard to FERC and the
states, irrespective of which approach is “better,” the Court has created
an uneven playing field.
D. The Consequences of the Court’s Uneven Approach in EPSA and
Hughes
The Court’s uneven approach to different governing nodes on the
grid threatens to upend its existing nodal state, consolidating power
within FERC while others are diminished. For instance, state programs
are currently under attack in the courts for potential Hughes violations,
while FERC is using its EPSA-backed control over the wholesale
markets to either diminish the power of state programs or kick them
out of the markets entirely. The end result could be a less innovative
grid that loses the benefits of decentralization.
Soon after Hughes came down, several state programs supporting
in-state generation came under attack. For instance, Connecticut’s
renewable energy procurement program (intended to encourage the
construction of renewable generators in Connecticut) was challenged
under a theory of Hughes-style preemption. The Second Circuit
ultimately upheld the program, but only after a careful formalistic
distinction between the Maryland program in Hughes and the
Connecticut program.255 New York’s and Illinois’ subsidies for nuclear
generators also faced litigation. Although in both cases the Courts of
Appeals upheld the programs under a similarly formalistic approach,

255. Allco Fin. Ltd. v. Klee, 861 F.3d. 82, 97–100 (2d Cir. 2017).
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petitions for certiorari for both of those decisions are pending before
the Supreme Court.256 And Minnesota’s Next Generation Energy Act
was struck down by the Eighth Circuit, in part because of concerns that
the program regulated capacity market prices in violation of Hughes.257
Meanwhile, FERC has been using its control over wholesale
markets to undermine state-based programs in a change from its past
practice. This phenomenon can be seen most clearly in the wholesale
capacity markets. In the past, FERC employed a “price floor” in the
capacity markets in order to prevent market participants from
manipulating capacity prices by artificially lowering them. These price
floors often had the unintended effect of shutting out bilateral
contracts and state-mandated procurement from the capacity markets
because, as discussed above, those contracts are often bid in at $0. In
order to counteract that effect, in the years prior to Hughes and EPSA,
FERC accommodated out-of-market contracts by selectively
exempting them from the price floor.258
But in the past year, FERC has indicated that it is no longer willing
to accommodate out-of-market contracts, particularly those mandated
by state programs. In an order issued in March 2018, FERC expressed
concern that out-of-market contracts “raise[] a potential conflict with
the Commission’s interest in maintaining efficient and competitive
wholesale electric markets.”259 To combat this, a minority of FERC
commissioners suggested that the price floor may be used to preempt
such programs from the capacity markets entirely.260 Three months
later, FERC officially abandoned its policy of accommodation,
declaring that “the integrity and effectiveness of the capacity market”
have become “untenably threatened” by these out-of-market
contracts, and that wholesale market operators must apply the price
floor to all generation forms with “few to no exemptions.”261
256. See Coal. for Competitive Elec. v. Ziebelman, 906 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2018), Petition for a
Writ of Certiorari, No. 18-879; Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. Star, 904 F.3d 518 (7th Cir. 2018),
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, No. 18-868.
257. North Dakota v. Heydinger, 825 F.3d 912, 927 (8th Cir. 2016) (Murphy, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment).
258. For a good explanation of this practice, see Miles Farmer & Bruce Ho, Federal Power
Rules Threaten New England Renewable Energy, NRDC EXPERT BLOG (Apr. 10, 2018),
https://www.nrdc.org/experts/bruce-ho/federal-power-rules-threaten-new-england-renewableenergy.
259. ISO New England Inc., 162 FERC ¶ 61,205, at *6 (2018).
260. Id. Commissioners LaFleur, id. at *37, Powelson, id. at *38–40, and Glick, id. at *42,
indicated that they did not agree with this preemption policy, suggesting that the position received
support from only two out of five Commissioners.
261. Order Rejecting Proposed Tariff Revisions, Granting in Part and Denying in Part
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FERC’s new stance towards out-of-market contracts leaves states
in an unenviable position. They can forego their generation programs
entirely, essentially ceding control over generation facilities to FERC’s
wholesale markets. Or they can require their utilities to purchase
capacity in FERC’s markets and buy state-mandated capacity
consistent with state renewable energy and other programs. But that
would force consumers to double-pay for capacity, once for the FERC
market and once for the state program. Or states could pull their
utilities out of the wholesale markets entirely and opt for a form of
state-owned generation and distribution—essentially, a governmentrun electricity industry. In other words, FERC, in its most recent
orders, is telling states that they can either acquiesce to FERC’s
demands or leave the wholesale markets.
Following both of these strands of electricity law phenomena—the
attack on state programs in the courts and in the FERC-run capacity
markets—to their logical ends leads to some troubling outcomes for
the electricity grid. As discussed in Parts II and III, the decentralized
electricity grid offers significant governance benefits. States can be the
sites of experimentation in grid technologies and management
techniques as well as local governance. States, in partnership with
direct and indirect self-governance nodes, have helped spur innovation
in solar, wind, energy storage, and distributed energy resources, in
some cases even supporting these resources until they could be scaled
up and competitive in the wholesale markets. The wholesale markets,
in turn, encourage cost-competitiveness and efficiency, allowing local
generation to access regional markets and larger customer bases. If
states abandon some of their more innovative programs due to threats
from FERC, or if the wholesale markets diminish in their reach due to
state withdrawal, these benefits of multi-nodal governance would be
lost.
The damage would be based upon an erroneous approach to
electricity grid governance as embodied in the Federal Power Act and
historical practice. As FERC Commissioner Richard Glick noted in his
dissent from the Commission’s June 2018 order:
It is an inevitable consequence of the FPA’s division of jurisdiction
over the electricity sector that one sovereign’s exercise of its

Complaint, and Instituting Proceeding Under Section 206 of the Federal Power Act, 163 FERC
¶ 61,236, at *2–3 (2018).
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authority will affect matters subject to the other sovereign’s
exclusive jurisdiction. . . . But the existence of such crossjurisdictional effects is not necessarily a ‘problem’ for the purposes
of the FPA. Rather, these cross-jurisdictional effects are the product
of the ‘congressionally designed interplay between state and federal
regulation’ . . . .262

Mistaking the complexities and interconnections of the electricity
grid for failures of grid governance, as FERC has done in its approach
the capacity markets and as the Supreme Court did in Hughes, is
misguided. And concentrating power within FERC, to the detriment
of other governing nodes, in order to correct this so-called problem
threatens to upend the nodal governance model of the grid. This could
result in a grid that is less innovative, less adaptable to new
technologies, less responsive to regional changes and local concerns.
V. CONCLUSION
The threat of consolidation of power within FERC at the expense
of other governing nodes on the grid is poised to get worse, not better.
As we saw in EPSA, the Court was very willing to give FERC
jurisdiction over new grid programs that intersect with the wholesale
markets. Demand response represents only the tip of the iceberg.
FERC may soon assert control over residential solar panels, electric
vehicles, and even residential smart thermostats. While we may want
to incorporate these devices into the wholesale markets, we may also
want to subject them to governance control at a state and local level as
well. Courts, policymakers, and regulators must recognize that the U.S.
electricity grid operates according to a nodal governance framework,
not a centralized, top-down system. Giving other nodes the ability to
exercise governing power alongside FERC allows the grid to innovate,
experiment, and adapt to the changing needs and preferences of
consumers, and better prepares the grid for the many challenges it
faces now and in the years to come.

262. Id. at *50 (Glick, Commissioner, dissenting).

